The partner mechanism includes many aspects, such as the partner's entry mechanism, exit mechanism, decision-making mechanism and distribution mechanism. This paper only discusses the benefit distribution mechanism, that is, the most basic matching of responsibilities and rights.
The main body of responsibility and right in different periods
There are usually three kinds of people in enterprises today: investors, employees and partners. Investors only pay, employees only contribute, and partners both pay and contribute. From this concept, the partner system is essentially to let the stakeholders of human capital, a factor of production, have the leading power, and finally achieve the goal of "* * * has capital contribution, * * * has management, * * * has profit and * * has risk".
In the era of industrialization, monetary capital plays a leading role, human capital plays an auxiliary role, capital determines the control right and residual income right of enterprises, and managers are only entrusted agents of capital, with limited power, limited income and limited pre-tax income. Because it is capital that determines the control right and residual income right of an enterprise, it is also reasonable for capital to bear all risks and equal rights and obligations.
In the era of knowledge economy, the human factor has become more and more important, especially in many fields of light assets. Human capital, that is, partners or partner teams begin to play a leading role, and monetary capital plays an auxiliary role. Partners decide the control of enterprises, such as Alibaba, Xiaomi and Vanke. In this case, who should decide the residual income right? Usually, where is the result, where is the heart, where is the benefit, and where is the focus. If the capital is allowed to determine the residual income right at this time, the partners will obviously not be willing, and the risks arising from the partners' decision, such as heavy losses, are unreasonable. If the capital is allowed to bear all or most of the residual income rights, then it is more reasonable to let the partners decide the residual income rights in order to fully embody the principle of equal rights and responsibilities and equal risk and income. The key is how to design this mechanism.
Several modes of partner mechanism design
In an enterprise where partners and investors coexist, there will be multiple stakeholders. For each different stakeholder, different governance models can be designed, and the model for reference is limited partnership. In the limited partnership system, the limited partner (LP) is responsible for capital contribution, not participating in management and not taking risks, while the general partner (GP) is responsible for investment management. Although it is only a part of the capital contribution, it also bears unlimited responsibility. Another model that can be used for reference is the theory of "superiority" and "inferiority" in investment and financial management. Priority income enjoys a relatively certain and upper bound expected rate of return, such as creditors, while inferior income has no definite rate of return target, and the residual income generated by investment belongs to inferior income. When an investment suffers losses, it is first borne by the inferior income and then given priority, which embodies the principle of equal risk and income.
In a partner-led or partially-led enterprise, it is usually a rational method to determine the responsibilities of partners according to the rights entrusted to them by the articles of association. If the partner has the right to operate, he must bear all the business risks. If a partner has the decision-making power, he must bear all the decision-making risks. Only in this way can they become a more reasonable and fair model for partners and investors.
A high degree of unity of responsibilities and rights is the focus of partner mechanism design.
In fact, the partner mechanism is a highly unified mechanism of responsibility and rights. The starting point starts with power, and as much power as there is, there are many responsibilities and corresponding interests.
Personally, I think the best one in this respect is Handu Yishe in Jinan, and its group system is very typical. They divided the front-line departments into more than 280 groups, and the management right of each group was completely in their own hands. The responsibilities, rights and interests of all groups are highly unified, as shown in figure 1 Handu Yishe group system.
In the era of industrialization, human capital neither bears risks nor enjoys the final residual income. In the era of knowledge economy, when human capital dominates enterprises, human capital should enjoy the final income and bear the final risk. In other words, when the investment is relatively reasonable, stable or has a certain growth return, the residual income should be distributed by the partners. If there is a loss, the partner should also bear the loss and pay the investor a reasonable return. Figures 2 and 3 are different descriptions of the income distribution enjoyed by human capital in different periods.
In order to avoid the dilemma that partners can't afford when losses occur, we can adopt the method of deferred payment and keep part of the annual income in the enterprise as a risk protection fund. That's what Taishan School of Management did. The year-end bonus of each department 1/2 was postponed for two years. If there is a loss in the future, it should be used to make up for the loss first.
Heze Zhendeli supermarket chain also adopted a similar model. The current manager and some excellent deputy managers of this company can compete for all store managers every year. Whoever has a high goal is the manager. If the promised target is not achieved by the end of the year, fill in the company's income (the income of the company when the target is completed) first. Those who fail to compete for posts will be laid off automatically. After years of practice, the effect is very good, as shown in Figure 4.
The advantage of this is that it can achieve a high degree of unity between power and responsibility, risk and income. Investors, partners and managers each enjoy their own rights and status, and bear their own corresponding risks. Of course, the identities of the three are not inseparable, but can be transformed into each other. For example, the company can make the manager a partner of the company through equity subscription and equity incentive. Similarly, if a partner leaves the company for other pursuits, he can also be a pure investor. However, no matter how you change your identity, the unity of responsibilities and rights is always the focus of the partnership system.
Everything is not perfect, and so is the "partner system". Whether the partner will use his control over the enterprise to harm the interests of investors, whether there will be related transactions, whether there will be a free ride for the partner, etc. These are all fully considered when designing the partnership mechanism, and need to be adjusted in time, or used together with other models to ensure that the partnership mechanism can play its maximum positive role.
Taishan management school