Wu Jun, the author of IT bestseller "Top of the Tide", put forward an impressive "genetic determinism", that is, when a large company wants to transform and occupy new fields and make subversive innovative products, it will often fail miserably.
China Mobile announced the establishment of a new media group, which will be officially put into operation on June 20 15. 10 On the evening of June 5438+05, Lenovo Group announced the establishment of a brand-new subsidiary to build a leading Internet-based intelligent terminal and service business in China. The company will officially start operation on April/20 15, and will have an independent company name and brand-new sub-brands. ...
In the era of great changes in the mobile Internet, China Mobile, Lenovo Group and other big companies have also accelerated the pace of innovation. When a big company makes innovations, people are often full of expectations, but there are also some doubts. There are too many things to be involved in the innovation of a big company. Can their innovation really succeed?
Wu Jun, a former Google senior engineer and author of the IT bestseller "Top of the Tide", put forward an impressive "genetic determinism", that is, due to the influence of the company's genes, when a large company wants to transform and occupy new areas and make subversive innovative products, it will often fail miserably.
For example, Motorola, Nokia, Intel, and Microsoft, although occupying undisputed monopoly positions in their respective industries, have declined to varying degrees during the changes of the times and industry transformation, and the dilemma of innovation within the system of large companies has become the norm.
When talking about this issue, Jack Welch once said: "The first year of managing a new production line with an output value of 50,000 US dollars is more difficult than the twentieth year of managing a company with a sales value of 500 million US dollars."
Therefore, the probability of failure of new projects established under the general large company system is very high. In the Internet industry, large companies are often startups instead of innovative products, and the failed products of large companies can be said to be "countless Bai Gujing":
Baidu "Yes"
Baidu has been thinking about how to carry unsold business traffic. From Baidu's point of view, from Baidu Yes to Aloha and Baidu Map, Baidu has been exploring in the O2O field, but the results are not satisfactory.
At the end of 20 10, Baidu, a local life service product, released a life channel to test the local life service. 20 1 1 March, yes, the mall was closed and the life service platform was officially transformed. However, Baidu's life development did not meet the expectations of the outside world. In order to have more autonomy, 20 1 1 was spun off from Baidu at the end of the year and later renamed Aloha. But Aloha was not successful. O2O has gradually been dominated by the mobile Internet, and its advantages are lower online. The Internet is no longer dominant, because users have to enjoy services anytime and anywhere ... Here are the reasons why Baidu failed:
In June 5438 +2007 10, Baidu established the e-commerce division and announced its high-profile entry into e-commerce. Taking C2C as a breakthrough, we hope to build "the largest online personal trading platform in the Internet field in China". At that time, Baidu believed that e-commerce based on search engines was the inevitable trend of future development, and the most advantageous one would be the king in this field.
On June 5438+ 10, 2008, Baidu was officially launched, and it was said that it would "defeat Taobao within three years". However, at the end of March 20 1 1, Baidu announced that it would close the Yes store business one month later, and the Yes store business would be transferred to partners such as le cool Tian, Yaodian 100 in a planned way. Then at the end of 20 1 1, Baidu's e-commerce division was split into independent companies. In 20 12, "Yes" was re-launched as "Aloha", but it was positioned as a local life information service platform. After the launch of Lohas, the business has been constantly adjusted, and many people in the industry also expressed their incomprehension. 2011March 3 1 day, Baidu's e-commerce website "You Ya" announced that after one month, the products, shops and transaction-related functions of the shopping platform will be closed, and the mall business will be transferred to partners such as le cool Tian, Yaodian 100.
"Yes" is gone. ...
Reason: born at an inopportune time
Yes, it was officially launched in 2008. I caught up with the fastest development of online shopping for three years. It can be said that I was born at the turning point of e-commerce development. Why don't good opportunities end well? The following points are the main reasons for its failure:
1, strategic error
Yes, the goal after going online is to be the second Taobao, which makes Yes adopt a follow-up strategy. Different from traditional industries, even in the traditional Internet field, the leading players in various sub-sectors of e-commerce often have absolute advantages, such as Taobao and JD.COM. Users have formed dependencies and habits. Later, if the challenger did not have subversive differentiated innovation, it would be difficult to break the existing market structure.
2, the flow advantage is no longer.
E-commerce is a market that desperately needs user stickiness. Baidu needs to go through many links to import traffic into the platform. For example, the registration and authentication of buyers and sellers, the application of payment tools such as Baifubao, etc. This is a declining process. Every time you go through a link, the flow will be attenuated. So every link is a risk. In the end, there are not many that can settle down and become the core indicators, and the flow advantage is getting smaller and smaller.
3. Lack of attractive business model
Simply fighting traffic has not adapted to the development of e-commerce at this stage. Baidu has realized this. In the new e-commerce strategy launched in the first half of 20 10, it is aimed at returning to the search advantage, launching a variety of advertising forms, fully satisfying the search delivery of e-commerce customers, and launching and gradually opening the product search based on' box computing'.
4. The layout of diversified resources is unbalanced.
The success of diversification depends on two points: whether you are based on your core competitiveness; Whether the allocation of resources is reasonable.
If Baidu wants to succeed in e-commerce, the key is to find a manager who really understands e-commerce. Li Mingyuan, the founder who resigned last year, was praised by Li Yanhong for his outstanding performance in the community. However, his experience in the field of e-commerce is blank, and even if he does well in execution, he still can't escape the fate of failure.
In terms of diversified allocation of resources, Baidu has its own set of models. Usually a new business department is established, and the parent company will send a right-hand man to be the general manager. Compared with the management team of startups in the Internet field, which consists of three backbones: CEO, CTO and marketing director, the general manager of Baidu Division often holds three positions and faces great challenges. Baidu attaches great importance to existence, but Baidu's resource allocation follows the principle of 72 1, that is, core search business can get 70% of resources, search-related business can get 20% of resources, and innovative business is 10%. Both search-related and innovative businesses have multiple projects, and the funds and management support they can get can only be a fraction or a dozen of them.
In addition, the talents at the operation level of the parent company have not yet formed a * * * sharing mechanism with its business units, that is to say, the management talents of the business units are not the first-class talents of Baidu as a whole. Under such a framework and resource model, it is not easy to do it well.
Intelligent qu Wei Dian Shang
In the huge Internet map of "Emperor Penguin", there are still several areas that do not stand in the front row, and e-commerce is one of them. "Building a vassal by flow" was the only way to win intelligence and fun in the past. In most new fields, Zhiqu can always quickly delimit its sphere of influence, rewrite the competition pattern, and even take the lead with its traffic advantage and user base. However, in the field of e-commerce, traffic is no longer a sharp sword, and the late-comer advantage with universal effect suddenly fails. E-commerce, in terms of intelligence and fun, is more like a new business different from the past. It once compared the future development of smart and interesting e-commerce to climbing Mount Everest, which goes without saying. After stumbling for nearly 10 years, smart and fun e-commerce seems to have finally clarified its development ideas, integrated various internal and external resources and United front, and tried to achieve a counterattack through the path of "WeChat+mobile e-commerce". Success or failure. At present, it is inevitable that smart FUN e-commerce has left too many "homework" in its early years. ...
Cause 1: Flow shackle
Ma Zeng, CEO of Zhiqu.com, said frankly that "(e-commerce) has taken many detours". Explaining smart FUN's e-commerce business itself is a hassle. Even after the integration, it still has three home appliance websites. There is C2C pat net at the bottom, similar to Taobao; B2C self-operated platform Yixun.com, similar to JD.COM; There is also QQ online shopping on the B2C open platform, similar to Tmall. In addition, there are smart FUN's investments in the field of e-commerce, such as Kelan Diamond Network, Gaopeng Network, B2C online shoe city Haolebu, maternal and child community website, group buying website F Group, etc.
After Smart Fun introduced the traffic into the pat, it was able to get high sales at that time, but the customers bought cheap promotional items and left. Success is Xiao He, failure is me. Traffic is the most important "trump card" of the intellectual interest system. In backward areas, users and traffic are often used to grab the opponent's market with the rhythm of imitation and improvement. The success of Smart Fun can be summarized as "QQ+" mode, that is, users are "bound" to the smart fun boat with QQ as the core and free social functions, and then various items such as selling games, videos, searching and reading are carried on the boat. In the field of e-commerce, Zhiqu is still trying to replicate this model, but unfortunately the traffic advantage has expired.
Baidu has. It can be said that it is a warning. Although Baidu once introduced huge traffic and fostered the e-commerce business "Baidu has it", it eventually lost. Yes, founder Li Mingyuan once summed up: "Behind e-commerce, there are actually more supply chains, commodities, logistics, warehousing and brand building. E-commerce competes for goods and commercial services, and does not depend on the detailed design and website experience of shopping websites. "
"Traffic can really bring click-through rates and achieve the purpose of gathering popularity, but it may not be able to do business; Even if you do business, you may not be able to retain customers. " Wang Qi, a senior strategist at IBM, thinks that, to some extent, traffic may be the fetters of the development of e-commerce. Smart Fun is used to pushing promotional information by traffic, which leads to a high correlation between sales volume and promotional activities, but the customer retention rate is relatively low.
"Occasionally, I will see attractive prices and buy goods. This demand is sporadic and cannot last long. " Wang Qi further analyzed that the "QQ+" model is essentially based on social relations. For pure Internet products, the spread of social relations is more advantageous because of its fixed "light" and "fast" circles. However, e-commerce needs to transform social relations into business relations, involving many links such as supply chain, warehousing and logistics, which is far from being solved by traffic.
In addition, traffic is shaping the B-end ecology, and smart and fun e-commerce has also taken a detour. Wu Shuguang, CEO of Zhiqu E-commerce, once admitted that in the past, Zhiqu only pulled traffic to the e-commerce platform and was the operation mode of the planned economy. "If a real market economy is used, smart FUN's internal traffic will be marketized, allowing merchants to spend money to buy traffic and cherish traffic. At the same time, smart and fun e-commerce companies should also establish a good ecological environment, give businesses more non-paid traffic, and form organic growth. " Wu Shuguang said.
"If you just attract merchants with low prices or even free traffic, it must be simple and rude." The above-mentioned insiders admit that merchants prefer to solidify customers into search rather than solidify traffic promotion, and need an increasingly prosperous platform to do business on it for a long time.
Reason two: the sorrow of the supply chain
The shackles of traffic may only be highlighted under certain circumstances, but the supply chain problem is the most important lesson that smart and fun e-commerce lacks.
At the beginning of the development of e-commerce, there was a debate in the industry. Some people think that e-commerce companies are still "light companies" and do not need to "circle" suppliers like department stores and home appliance chain stores, let alone establish their own logistics and warehousing.
Zhiqu e-commerce takes the opposite path as described by Li Mingyuan. According to the introduction of the former product manager of a smart e-commerce, the product managers and engineers of smart e-commerce are more obsessed with testing the online shopping process and response speed, hoping to reduce steps and improve the experience, but ignoring business systems such as supply chain and logistics that need stronger technical support.
Another reason is that smart fun prefers internal incubation. An executive of Zhiqu Group told reporters that before, the mainstream business of Zhiqu was almost all internal incubation, such as research and development, promotion and payment. The initial e-commerce development was also this idea, but it failed.
"Ali's e-commerce started with 2B Alibaba business, and it is more handy in dealing with B-side relationships and building a platform ecosystem; JD.COM Mall is equivalent to a traditional retail origin and has always been closely related to suppliers. " An' investor' familiar with smart FUN e-commerce told reporters that the chain of e-commerce is actually longer than that of general Internet products, and the seemingly strong online advantages of smart FUN are insignificant in the supply chain covering customer perception, logistics and warehousing.
Everything happens for a reason. The supply chain relationship that smart FUN e-commerce missed in the early years is more directly reflected in category expansion. The whole category brings not only the retention rate, but also survival. A typical case abroad is the battle between Amazon and Newegg. With its scale advantage, Amazon easily suppressed newegg, a 3C vertical website. Even though its household appliances account for less than one third of its scale, category expansion has accumulated a lot of cash flow for it.
According to the monitoring data of China E-Commerce Research Center, as of the first half of 20 13, Tmall occupied 50.4% of the online shopping market; JD.COM ranked second, accounting for 20.7%, Suning.cn 5.7%, and smart e-commerce only accounted for 5.4%.
Reason 3: Time window
"As an e-commerce platform, looking back, you can cut in from a strong category, but it can't be all of you." Bu Guangqi, vice president of Zhiqu and CEO of Yixun.com, said that the platform must have strong carrying capacity. If this function is positioned in the service system and support system, there will be more room in the future. But the problem is that there is an unwritten law of Internet competition-user inertia, that is, for products with the same characteristics, people are not used to changing their accustomed products at will. Expanding the category of smart e-commerce is more like racing against time, solidifying users in the search of smart e-commerce, rather than being transformed when buying other categories of goods on other websites. After all, it is easier to keep users than to get them back.
With the rise of WeChat, it seems that it has brought huge imagination to smart and interesting e-commerce. Once, Zhang Xiaolong, the godfather of WeChat, asked Bu Guangqi if he could "kill the shopping cart". So on the day of "Double 1 1" last year, Yixun.com and WeChat launched the WeChat store. Obviously, in the field of IM, WeChat has been far ahead, throwing opponents out of several streets; The smart and fun e-commerce is far from being worthy of WeChat in terms of volume. One of the reasons is that although the daily average number of WeChat stores has been about 1 1 since its launch last year, the unit price of merchandise customers is mostly in the range above 200 yuan. "A century-old shop is common, and a century-old Internet product is rare." An Ali executive once said that it is not easy to cultivate and migrate users' buying habits. Ali is also actively deploying mobile e-commerce and pushing mobile phones such as Taobao, Micro-Amoy, Taodian and Communication.
In the competition with Ali's e-commerce, the executives of Zhiqu e-commerce have been reluctant to talk more, but privately said: "The disparity is too big, I haven't thought about it yet." However, smart and fun e-commerce companies have always regarded JD.COM as an opponent, and have invested a lot of money and flow to support Yi Xun against JD.COM, and even entered the Beijing market, the home base of JD.COM.
Fetion from China Mobile
Recently, China Mobile's actions have attracted much attention. In addition to 4G, China Mobile is still undergoing rapid transformation this year, trying to adapt to the rapid growth of mobile Internet by setting up independent companies, and new media companies and Internet companies were born. At present, the preparatory work of the new media company is running normally. According to the plan, China Mobile will set up a new media group company and five subsidiaries in music, video, reading, games and animation. The future name of the company is "Migu Culture Technology Group Company". It is planned that industrial and commercial registration will be completed by the end of 10, and within three years, it will invest10.4 billion yuan to build a new media giant, and strive to formally put it into operation in 20 15+08. Details of China Mobile's innovations in recent years: the official launch of iPhone 5S and iPhone 5C supporting China Mobile's 3G and 4G networks and the release of the first self-owned brand 4G mobile phone; Cooperating with Zhiqu and pushing traffic red packets with WeChat, it is not difficult to see that the giants are trying more innovations ... Of course, China Mobile has also had many failed cases on the road of innovation, and Fetion is one of them. ...
In May 2007, China Mobile established Fetion; It has been fully opened since June 5, 2007; In 2008, the first edition of Fetion was launched; By the second quarter of 2009, the number of Fetion users had reached 65,438+84 million, an increase of 64.9% over the same period of 2008, but the user activity was only 29%, while the intelligent FUNQQ maintained an average user activity of 40%. By the end of 20 10, the number of active users of China Mobile Fetion has reached 65,438+83 million, ranking second in the domestic instant messaging market share, second only to intelligent FUNQQ. 2011On June 26th, China Mobile transferred the operation right of Fetion to Guangdong Mobile South Base, and the operation right changed, and the Fetion business was completely abandoned by China Mobile.
Fetion failed for many reasons, but there are three main reasons:
First, qq exists as a "god"
Fetion did not have much impact on smart FUN. Most netizens still focus on smart FUNQQ. What is the main reason?
1, its software appearance and icons are dull, which is not as smooth, comfortable, vivid and lifelike as the intelligent FUNQQ software design. If you want the appearance of the software to be equivalent to the layout of an advertisement, users will be uncomfortable to use without a good appearance and icon of the software. You should use software for entertainment, but you are disgusted with the rigid layout of Fetion. Are you still in the mood to use your fetion?
2, Fetion expression is not vivid enough. The expression amount is too large, which is seriously out of harmony with the window proportion.
3. The interval ratio between messages in the Fetion message window is not harmonious, which also gives users an uncomfortable feeling and greatly reduces the attractiveness of Fetion. In the final analysis, the above three points are that the design of Fetion is not enough. I don't know if you have found that the design of mobile is very dull, or dull is the patent of mobile. If you want to catch up with smart and interesting mobile in appearance, you must learn from it, even innovate or even surpass it.
Second, super pain points
That is, Fetion should not be attached to the mobile phone number, and should not change with the change of the mobile phone number. Instead, the user should have a fixed Fetion signal, and the user can bind the Fetion signal to different mobile phone numbers at will, and send the message to the user's mobile phone by SMS when the user is not online. This makes the user stop changing the number and the signal changes accordingly.
Third, poor operation and management.
In 2007, Fetion business began to be included in the annual KPI assessment index of provincial mobile companies, which became the task of provincial mobile companies and was pushing Fetion. Fetion suddenly surpassed many IM application users at that time, and the number of users soared. However, at that time, it was said that the outsourcing strategy for Fetion's operation increased the difficulty of Fetion's operation and management, and laid a hidden danger for the subsequent development and improvement of Fetion software.
1. Fetion has excluded China Unicom and telecom users since its launch. Originally, it was an advantage of Fetion to bind with the mobile phone number, but China Mobile turned it into a disadvantage. The key problem of communication among the three operators of Fetion is that SMS should be charged back to Fetion, and the charging problem among the three operators is also one of the difficulties. In fact, it is difficult for all industries to find a state of separation from each other like the three major domestic operators, wasting too much money, killing too much energy and increasing too much internal friction.
2. The application is too single to be extended. After Fetion started, the version update was too slow and there were no good derivatives. Some packaging that imitates QQ is not well done. 3. Who can stand the abnormal KPI promotion? 4. The mobile phone client is inconvenient, the advertising promotion effect is not good, there is no real marketing, the positioning is vague, the appearance is rigid, and it will not create momentum. ...
There is another very important statement about Fetion. The management doesn't want to promote Fetion at all, and they don't want to infringe on their SMS revenue. There is also some truth.
Nokia (headquartered in Finland)
On the morning of September 3, 20 13, Microsoft and Nokia officially announced that Microsoft had acquired Nokia's mobile phone business unit for $765,438+700 million and obtained relevant patent authorization. This means that Nokia has lost its most dazzling pearl in the past, leaving only two non-core businesses: maps and network communication. After experiencing the repeated impacts of smartphones represented by Android and Apple in the past five years, Nokia, once the boss of the mobile phone industry, finally put an end to this hopeless struggle. In the face of Nokia's market value of 303 billion euros in 2000, which fell to the price of 765,438+700 million dollars, there are always some curiosity and responsibilities that make people look back on the course of Nokia's mobile phone from prosperity to decline. Summarizing Nokia's "more successes, more failures" may have certain reference value for other companies. Here are some lessons from Nokia's failure:
1, slow action, missed the opportunity of smart machine.
General, no company can win forever. Simulator to 2G mobile phone, Nokia overtook Motorola. With the advent of 3G smart phone era, Nokia should be able to be surpassed. But this is not the case. Nokia has the position of the world's mobile phone boss, overlooking many mobile phone manufacturers. When the iPhone came out in 2007, Nokia ridiculed that Jobs must first convert brand awareness into market share. Then the Android phone came, Samsung and HTC got up because of Android, and the touch screen era came. Nokia still insists on the physical buttons of Symbian system and mobile phone. As a result, Nokia's market share dropped from more than 40% in 2008 to 20 1 1 and was later surpassed by Samsung.
2, the boss mentality, refused to form an alliance with the operating system rookie.
Today, it is a foregone conclusion that Nokia belongs to the Windows Phone platform. Previously, there have been voices with illusions about Nokia's Android phones, and its share in Nokia has declined. As long as Nokia does Android, it can always pull back a city with its excellent hardware capabilities. But he didn't. Nokia chose the operating system because it values being a leader, which is in line with its boss mentality. In Nokia's view, choosing Android is the best, and it is only Google's largest foundry, working for Google. By choosing Microsoft, you can build another mobile phone system ecosystem. However, from 20 1 1 to 20 13, the Windows Phone ecosystem lags behind other systems, leaving Nokia in trouble.
3. The strategy is vacillating and constantly tossing from scratch.
Nokia should make full use of its own advantages and find a firm way forward when many smartphone manufacturers compete for market share. But this is not the case. Symbian has not adapted to the development of smart phone era. Except for Apple, almost all mobile phone manufacturers have turned to the Android platform. Nokia chose to cooperate with Intel to do Meego from scratch, but later gave up. All previous investments were made in Shui Piao. Less than a week after the release of N9 based on Meego, Elop clearly responded that despite the huge response of N9, Nokia still had to give up MeeGo and concentrate entirely on the development of Windows Phone. 20 1 1 At the beginning of the year, Nokia formed an alliance with Microsoft and turned to the Windows Phone platform, almost from scratch. No matter how good the foundation is, it can't stand the toss.
4. Sticking to traditional thinking and closed strategy led to the failure of mobile Internet strategy.
In 2007, Nokia took the lead in launching the mobile Internet Ovi store in the world, which was 1 year earlier than Apple's App Store. Then Google launched Google Play, and the success of Apple and Google's app stores proved that we should not try to take away all the products in the industrial chain, but open cooperation. But this is not the case. Contrary to the open platform created by Apple and Google, Nokia's transition to the Internet is more like vertical integration of the Internet. In order to launch location-based services, Nokia spent a lot of money to acquire navigation software companies, map companies and even related operating websites. However, this model of taking all industries as a whole does not seem to improve Nokia's competitiveness in the Internet world. After spending a huge sum of $654.38+0.5 billion, Nokia Ovi strategy failed.
5, always underestimate the market, huge R&D investment can not be transformed into productivity.
As early as 2004, Nokia developed touch technology, even the popular 3D technology. Looking at Nokia's financial report, it is estimated that Nokia will spend 5.8 billion euros on R&D in 20 10, which is more than four times that of Apple. Nokia has the largest R&D resources, which should have become weapons on the battlefield. But this is not the case. They always say that the market is too small for anyone to buy and the cost is too high. It was not until one year after the release of the iPhone that Nokia launched the first mobile phone with touch technology. But at this time, Nokia has mastered touch technology for several years.
6. Poor employment. For Americans, running a European-style company is an adventure.
Nokia is a Finnish company. 20 10 September, Steven Elop, an American professional manager, took over Nokia and became the first non-Finnish "head", which was a gorgeous adventure in itself. After he took office, the market value of Nokia dropped from 30 billion euros in 20 10 to 10 billion euros this spring. Since Nokia announced its cooperation with Microsoft in February 20 1 1, the company's share price has fallen by more than 50%. Steven Elop, the current CEO of Nokia, is from Microsoft. After taking office, he constantly made pro-Microsoft strategies and repeated strategies, questioning his undercover. There is a lot of distrust in Nokia. Some shareholders even launched Plan B, asking the board of directors to expel Elop.
Now, after the transaction between Nokia and Microsoft is completed, Elop will return to Microsoft and report directly to Ballmer. Everyone regrets the fate of Nokia, but Elop still smiles.
Nokia social portal Facebook home page
Social giant Facebook has been trying to deeply integrate more content into Android smartphones for years, so Facebook Home was grandly released in April and April of 20 13. Shortly after its release, Facebook Home declined, and the number of early users was far less than expected. "This is not the right product at the right time," said Brian Blau, an analyst at Gartner. "Facebook always thought they could turn things around, but they didn't have the conditions to do it." The download volume of Facebook Home has been declining since it was launched. In 19 countries, it can only enter the top 500, but in most countries, it can only rank between 300 and 400. Facebook dissolved the Facebook home page engineer team. This move means that Facebook's dream of entering the smartphone market is shattered. The following are the reasons for its failure:
1. Pay attention to increasing the number of users
From the purpose of publishing, Facebook launched Facebook Home to increase the number of users who use Facebook, but in the end, Facebook users just changed to another application of Facebook in form, but with different names. From the perspective of increasing the number of users who use their own applications, Facebook Home is completely redundant.
2. Unreasonable functional design, touching the bottom line of users.
But when users use Facebook Home, all the information mentioned above will disappear naturally. Facebook Home is obviously suspected of invading the user's smartphone homepage. Just after the release of Facebook Home, a survey by Mashable, a well-known technology blog, showed that in the choice of whether Facebook Home was an invasion of Facebook Home, 77% of the voting users chose "Yes", and 84% of them were very concerned about this "invasion". It can be seen that Facebook Home gave users the feeling of buying and selling hard. And this is what users are most disgusted with.
3. Conflicts of self-interest with partners
From the partner's point of view, at first Facebook Home was supported by only one mobile phone manufacturer, HTC First, but HTC First quickly withdrew from the market. Many mainstream mobile phone manufacturers are reluctant to cooperate with Facebook because they are considering developing their own theme applications.