1, differences in understanding. Traditionally, the planning, construction, management and service of a city should be integrated, centralized and direct, and the establishment of municipal districts is only an aid to the unified management of the municipal government. The management affairs that the municipal government can undertake should not be allocated to all districts, so the urban belt cannot have greater independence. Compared with the early municipal districts, this view is adaptable and feasible, but with the development of the times, the continuous expansion of the city scale, the increasing management affairs and the increasingly detailed division of labor, this view is out of date. At the same time, due to the short development history of municipal districts, the lack of relevant laws, and insufficient understanding of municipal districts, it is unilaterally believed that municipal districts are only the dispatched offices of the municipal government and do not have the same subject status as counties.
2. The status gap. The development of municipal districts is influenced by regional and time differences, and the development status is also different. In the developed coastal provinces, most municipal districts have a high degree of industrialization, developed economy, strong economic strength and higher political status than counties. However, Yandu District is different from county and city. Although they all belong to the "county-level people's government", in fact, their management authority cannot be compared with that of county-level cities and counties.
3. Policy differences. In terms of organization establishment, the organization establishment of the district is generally tighter than that of the county (city), and the number of personnel is also quite different from that of the county (city). In terms of financial management, municipal districts have implemented the financial system of city and district contracts, which evolved from reimbursement system. They belong to the municipal level, and they are still "grabbing food in the pot" and have no first-class financial accounting status in the province. County-level cities and counties can get financial and policy support from both provinces (regions) and cities, but it is difficult for municipal districts to get such support, and the support of cities to municipal districts depends on the financial situation of cities. These are all concrete manifestations of unclear subject status.
(B) the administrative law enforcement is not independent enough
Administrative law enforcement refers to the activities of state administrative organs, organizations entrusted by law and their public officials to exercise administrative power and implement laws and regulations formulated by the state legislature in accordance with legal authority and procedures. As a legal administrative subject, municipal districts have set up many relevant functional institutions corresponding to their superiors, and each administrative law enforcement subject has an independent legal person status. However, because each administrative subject has a corresponding superior leading organ or competent department, there is a relationship of subordination and obedience, and Du Yan and the city have the same functions in the same city in the region, the law enforcement ability of administrative law enforcement subjects is subject to many restrictions and constraints, resulting in a difficult situation of law enforcement. For example, law enforcement units such as district urban management, public security, culture and health are often restricted by municipal authorities and even interfered by superior leaders when performing their tasks. In this way, its ability of independent law enforcement is greatly reduced, and it is possible to abandon the principle of rule of law in order to cater to superiors. In urban management, the management object of cities and municipal districts is the urban area, which is prone to the phenomenon that beneficial things compete for management and unprofitable things shirk each other.
(C) the distribution of functions is not symmetrical enough
Function allocation refers to the matching and setting of responsibilities and functions. Generally speaking, it is the distribution of power, responsibility and interests. According to the law, municipal districts should enjoy the political, economic, social, cultural and other administrative rights within their respective administrative areas, and obtain mutual benefits. However, in practice, Yandu District is restricted by the integrity of urban development in many aspects, such as the decision-making power of related economic affairs, the right to use district-level resources, and the right to daily management of the city, or it needs to be submitted to the city for examination and approval, or it unconditionally obeys the city management, so the administrative power of the district is intercepted accordingly, and its development is therefore limited. Mainly as follows:
1. The district government has the responsibility of the first-level government, but it does not have the authority that the first-level entity government should have. On the one hand, the municipal government assessed Yandu District according to the requirements of the county government. For example, in promoting economic development, the city is no different from the county (city) in assigning tasks such as GDP, fiscal revenue and attracting investment to the district; In terms of achieving regional stability, comprehensive management of social stability and one-vote veto are implemented. On the other hand, the district government has not fulfilled the above responsibilities and completed the rights it should enjoy, but if it fails to complete the task, it will be "punished". For example, the municipal government has given the municipal district the task of "two taxes", and the responsibility for paying taxes lies with the district government, while the power to impose taxes lies with the tax sub-bureau. Because the district government has no right to ask about the property of the tax bureau, the work is extremely difficult. In order not to intercept funds, the district government has to spend a lot of time and energy to coordinate the relationship with the tax authorities, and sometimes it has to pay a certain amount of labor remuneration or bonus to ask the tax authorities to "help" collect taxes. There is even a phenomenon of "buying taxes" in the towns and streets of some municipal districts.
2. The lines are staggered. For a long time, urban construction and various management work are mainly based on rules and regulations, which determines that the district government has no right to exercise the corresponding management functions even if it has corresponding functional institutions, and the role of blocks has not been fully exerted. For example, the district government has a construction committee or a construction bureau, but the main responsibility of the district construction bureau is to manage the maintenance and renovation of Jian 'an enterprises and small streets. And the transformation of the old city and municipal construction within the jurisdiction are basically the responsibility of the Municipal Construction Committee and other departments. In this way, almost every major construction project, the municipal government has to set up a new temporary command organization, with the city leaders as commanders or team leaders, and some city leaders even have dozens or even dozens of commanders or team leaders. This has not mobilized the enthusiasm of the district government to build the city, but also distracted the energy of the city leaders, leaving the municipal government with no time to perform the functions of city governing the county. Another example is that the district government has a health bureau, but the district health bureau has no right to manage and supervise the medical institutions and drug markets within its jurisdiction. With the expansion of the jurisdiction, it is beyond the unified jurisdiction of the Municipal Health Bureau, which leads to the disorder of the medical and health market in this area. This management system with too much intervention affects the enthusiasm of this work, and it is also prone to management dead ends and "blind areas".
3. Vacancy of power. The development history of municipal districts is not long, with great differences, and the lack of authority is more serious. For example, most municipal districts with urban and rural areas are established on the basis of the original suburbs and urban areas. After the abolition of the new urban and rural system, municipal districts divided the original suburban territories and took over the rural areas with a wide area of the original suburbs. However, apart from adding several agricultural departments, the new government functional institutions basically followed the original urban settings, and did not set up corresponding institutions and adjust their functions according to the new situation of urban and rural areas and the socialist market economy. In this way, management "faults" will inevitably appear. Due to the unified management of Du Yan district government, the municipal government is almost invited to organize and coordinate everything, and the work of the district government lacks due independence and initiative. This situation is not conducive to the unified leadership and management of the municipal government, and even affects the healthy development of politics, economy, culture, society and other undertakings in the jurisdiction.
(D) unreasonable institutional setup
1. There are many vertical management departments. Due to the need of centralization and strengthening the management of some state affairs, some ministries and commissions of the state and provincial governments directly extend their "legs" to the grassroots and set up vertical management departments; In order to strengthen leadership or centralized law enforcement, municipal party committees and governments have followed the example of dual management, thus forming a situation in which "central army", "local army" and "guerrillas" are in the same place, mixed management and repeated law enforcement. As far as Yandu District is concerned, there are currently more than six sub-bureaus of public security (including traffic police and fire fighting), national tax, local tax, land and real estate, and planning. Since 20 15, industry and commerce, quality supervision and drug administration have also implemented territorial management. However, these departments that were not placed under the local government almost controlled the key departments in Du Yan, and the functions and powers of the district government were severely weakened. According to the relevant policies and regulations, the personnel and administrative relationship of the vertical management department is at the top, the party organization is at the local level, and the local party committees and governments have the right to lead and supervise according to law. However, the actual operation is because the district government has no right to ask about the people, money and things in the vertical management department. Very few departments often use the instructions of their superiors as a "shield". They listen to the district government's deployment arrangements and do whatever they want. Some people don't even bother to attend regional meetings, let alone ask for instructions and report. However, in the event of an illegal administrative act, the district government will inevitably "get the board", become the defendant, and even make compensation according to law.
2. The functions of the municipal and district governments are isomorphic. Influenced by the planned economic system for a long time, the establishment of institutions in municipal districts generally emphasizes the up-and-down counterpart and unified setting, which leads to the isomorphism of functions and even the phenomenon of "fighting" among departments. For example, the District Construction Bureau under the Municipal Construction Bureau has very limited authority, and is basically in the position of "helping others", "supporting role" and "collecting junk", which is passive and ineffective and idles a lot of human and financial resources in vain. For example, setting up a district document retrieval team under the municipal document retrieval team often leads to "breaking up with one's own family" because of the conflict of interest in law enforcement.
3. Multi-head law enforcement and repeated law enforcement. Because the municipal and district governments are located in the same city, their institutions are similar and their functions and powers are consistent, the phenomenon of "one thing is managed by more than one person, and beneficial things are competing for management" often occurs. In the renovation of the catering industry in the jurisdiction, according to the division of labor, the departments of industry and commerce, health, food, fire protection, urban management, taxation, etc. all have the right to manage and should manage. As a result, the district has just arrived in the city, and there is no need to pay fines, apply for permits, eat, drink, and have fun. After such repeated tossing, the store was exhausted and miserable.
(5) The operation mechanism is not smooth.
1, the division of municipal and district management authority is not standardized. For a long time, the division of functions and authorities between cities and municipal districts has not been clearly defined by specific laws, and most of them are determined by provinces and cities themselves, which is quite arbitrary. On the one hand, the power of major decision-making and command, coordination and supervision, which is related to the overall situation, principle and clearly stipulated by law, needs to be concentrated at the municipal level, so that urban management can play a centralized and unified role; On the other hand, according to the requirements of urban public management and public service, it should be decomposed and implemented step by step, so that the management and service work can truly achieve the effect of vertical to the end, horizontal to the edge and comprehensive coverage. How to adhere to the organic combination of unified management and graded responsibility? In the face of this dilemma, the degree of retraction varies from place to place, some are greater than the release, and some are enlarged. In Linyi, Shandong Province, there was a phenomenon that "a project must be stamped with at least 36 official seals from project initiation to construction". However, in any case, the actual work is always a game of power and a struggle for interests. Yandu District did not break through the traditional framework as usual. Although there is no phenomenon in Linyi, Shandong Province, there is still a lack of standardization in the division of management authority.
2. Lack of financial independence. In the financial management of cities and districts in China, the financial management system of "unified revenue and unified expenditure" has been implemented for a long time; In the mid-1980 s, the fiscal responsibility system of "two lines of revenue and expenditure and graded responsibility" was implemented; Since 1994, the tax-sharing reform has been implemented, and the municipal and district financial systems have undergone many adjustments and changes. The current financial management system in Yandu District basically follows the management mode of "two lines of revenue and expenditure, approved base, settlement quota or subsidy quota" in financial contracting. This system obviously has some limitations, such as poor independence, unreasonable division of income and expenditure, poor operability, etc., which makes the limited financial resources in the region bear unlimited responsibilities and forms a situation of "small horse-drawn cart", which can not meet the demand of economic construction and social welfare undertakings for financial investment, seriously restricting the development of urban and rural economy and affecting the effective play of the overall function of the city.
3. Management is not standardized. At present, the administrative system of municipal districts in China has not been brought into the legal track. So far, there is no special administrative organization law. Although the Constitution and the Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments clarify the legal status of municipal districts as a first-class local government and stipulate the main functions of municipal district governments, they do not further clarify the key contents such as institutional setup, division of powers and functional allocation of municipal districts. In fact, the administration of municipal districts is still in the exploratory stage, and the management system varies greatly from place to place.
(6) unclear powers and responsibilities of villages and towns
In the municipal districts of the urban-rural fringe, towns and villages are the grass-roots governments under their leadership. Because the system of "city with township" has not been implemented for a long time, there are also many problems that need to be straightened out in the relationship between districts and towns.
1, fragmentation leads to unclear responsibilities and authorities of township governments. At present, the relevant departments of cities and municipal districts have many agencies in towns and villages, such as public security, land and justice. These institutions are all based on rural areas. Although they are administratively under the dual leadership and are dominated by blocks, except for the relationship between the party and the masses in villages and towns, the authority of other people, finances, materials and business management is mostly at the higher level, and the township government has no right to ask questions. Moreover, some illegal acts of these institutions cannot be controlled and stopped in villages and towns, which greatly reduces the management functions of the township government.
2. Small township responsibilities lead to inadequate work. The relationship between township governments and village committees has changed from the previous relationship between leaders and led to the relationship between guidance and guided today, and township governments are not allowed to interfere in the affairs within the scope of villagers' autonomy according to law. This management mode from control and command to service and guidance has made some township leaders and cadres feel uncomfortable. They feel that "the old method is ineffective, the brute method is ineffective, and the new method is unclear", and they are very confused and helpless. Most of the financial relations between township governments and district governments have not formed a first-level independent finance. Due to the cancellation of rural overall planning and village retention, agricultural tax has withdrawn from the historical stage, and some places have not engaged in income sharing, and the administrative fees that have been reduced year by year are all collected by the competent authorities. The township government cut off the source of income, and a considerable number of townships became "reimbursement-oriented" finances, and a considerable number of districts and towns successively implemented "township financial district management". Without financial support and financial control, township governments are naturally stretched in promoting management and services.
3. The change of roles leads to the overstaffing of township people. Most of the existing towns and villages were merged and formed during the period of "withdrawing districts (district offices, county government agencies between counties and villages)" in the 1990s, which generally caused serious overstaffing and redundancy. In recent years, with the transformation of township government functions and the promotion of tax and fee reform, township cadres have directly intervened in farmers' micro-economic activities such as farming operation, turned to directly provide farmers with production services such as information consultation, technology introduction and guidance, and turned from urging farmers to collect "national imperial grain tax" to strengthening social affairs management, maintaining normal economic order and improving people's livelihood, which has produced more surplus personnel for township governments. Among them, the "seven stations and eight institutes" belonging to towns and villages, and the old, the weak, the sick and the disabled, the low education level and the lack of professional and technical expertise are the majority. These people haven't reached retirement age, so it's hard to find their way out. As a result, they have become a heavy burden on district and township finances.
Second, the reason analysis
The above-mentioned problems existing in municipal districts reflect the disadvantages of the current administrative management system. Looking at the essence through the phenomenon and deeply analyzing the root causes, it is not difficult to find that the causes of these problems are various and have certain * * *. As far as Yandu District itself is concerned, there are the following reasons:
(A) historical limitations
On the one hand, it stems from the short establishment time and immature development. Counties under municipal jurisdiction are county-level administrative units, but the county system has a long history from the time of establishment. As early as the pre-Qin period, counties and counties were widely established in China, which has a history of more than 2,600 years. Many county and county systems have been passed down from generation to generation and are relatively stable. People have a comprehensive, profound, systematic and mature understanding of the county system in theory and practice. Compared with the county system, the time of municipal districts is shorter, and the time of urban-rural integration of municipal districts appears later. Judging from the historical conditions of the emergence of municipal districts, it is not necessary to set up municipal districts in ancient times because of its small scale, small population and poor division of management. Only in modern times, with the expansion of urban area and the sudden increase of population, it is difficult for the municipal government to directly manage all urban affairs. In this case, it is necessary to partition the city to help the municipal government exercise some urban management functions. It can be seen that the municipal districts originally appeared as an auxiliary institution of the municipal government, and the early municipal districts were basically dispatched institutions of the municipal government, and they had certain dependence and affiliation with the city from the day they were established. In this sense, the municipal districts themselves are inherently deficient. On the other hand, it stems from closed and outdated concepts and lacks innovation. At the beginning of the establishment of municipal districts in China, influenced by China's national conditions and restricted by outdated concepts, China simply followed the traditional county-level management system, without drawing lessons from foreign advanced urban administrative experience, let alone carrying out institutional innovation, so that the development of municipal districts in China has been in a "fuzzy" development state, with no strong legal support and examples to follow. Many administrative system reforms in China do not focus on the reform of municipal districts, which undoubtedly restricts and affects the development of municipal districts.
(B) Institutional constraints
As an important part of the administrative system, the development of municipal districts is restricted by various factors, and the restriction of institutional mechanisms is the key to hinder the development of municipal districts.
1, the influence of economic system. For a long time, China has implemented a planned economic system, a planned commodity economy, a planned commodity economy supplemented by market regulation, and a commodity economy combining planning and market regulation. It was not until the 14th National Congress of 1992 that the goal of China's economic system reform was finally established as the establishment of a socialist market economic system. It can be seen that the social, political and economic life of China has been dominated or influenced by the planned economic system for more than 40 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China. The basic feature of the planned economic system is to emphasize centralization, that is, the unity of planning, management, production and distribution. Reflected in the field of administrative management, it is centralization from top to bottom step by step. Its fundamental feature is that administrative power is controlled by the central and higher-level governments, and local and grass-roots governments are only the "megaphones" and offices of higher levels. Under this centralized management system, the initiative of independent development of municipal districts is not brought into play, which restricts the development of municipal districts.
2. Constraints of operating mechanism. At present, the operation mechanism of municipal districts mainly follows the operation mechanism of county-level government or urban management mechanism. As a special organizational system, municipal districts have different types and conditions, so it is impossible to apply one model. The level of economic development in some places is average. After the construction of the district, it will face many problems, such as the increase of financial support personnel, various statutory expenditures and public funds, the increase of management costs, and some historical debts. If the financial operation mechanism is not reformed, the financial difficulties of the municipal districts will be further aggravated, forming a situation in which the city is rich and the district is poor. The same is true of the power and responsibility distribution mechanism between cities and districts. Unreasonable division of powers between cities and districts will lead to "no position" and "inaction" in some areas of municipal districts. Under the inertia of the planned economy system, urban work often focuses on all aspects, and the rights and interests of blocks are not respected and guaranteed. For example, in terms of attracting investment, Du Yan does not enjoy the due rights such as tax refund, land transfer fee, and revenue sharing of administrative fees, so it is difficult to stimulate the enthusiasm of the district government and make a breakthrough in attracting investment and economic development.
3. Restricted by the safeguard mechanism. On the one hand, Yandu District is in a subordinate and weak position and lacks self-protection mechanism. As a part of the whole city, it has poor independence and strong dependence, so it must obey the unified development plan of the whole city in development, and has no autonomy and selectivity in development. On the other hand, there is a lack of external legal system. The phenomenon of "competing for profits and letting responsibilities" between cities and districts is very prominent, the relevant legal system has not been established and improved, and Yandu District is often in a state of inferiority and "submission".
(C) the lack of law
At present, there is no clear legal norm for the establishment of municipal districts in China, so the establishment of municipal districts is rather chaotic, which is mainly manifested in many aspects such as setting standards, setting methods, setting numbers, setting institutions and so on. There are no standards to follow, such as "what kind of city should have municipal districts", "how big municipal districts should be", "what conditions should a district have", "how to locate the functions of municipal districts" and "how to set up the institutions of municipal districts", which leads to the subjectivity and arbitrariness of the establishment of municipal districts. Mainly in the following aspects:
1, the setting mode is not standardized. "As a first-class formal local organizational unit, the setting mode of municipal districts is extremely irregular. This is the most fundamental problem in the current municipal district system, and other issues are often closely related to it. " The Constitution stipulates: "Municipalities directly under the Central Government and larger cities are divided into districts and counties." So whether a city is divided or not depends on the level of the city. This is because all municipal districts are formally established at or above the county level, so only cities with administrative levels above the county level are eligible to set up districts. Its basis is the so-called "larger city" in the Constitution, and its concept is equivalent to the later prefecture-level city, so the prefecture-level city is also called "the city with districts". However, literally, the constitution does not link the administrative level of a city with its districts. Whether a city is divided into districts depends on whether its scale reaches "big", and whether "big" refers to population or area, administrative level or economic scale, or both, which is difficult to grasp in practical judgment. As a result, there has been a simple practice of linking whether a city is divided into districts with the city level, and there has been an extreme imbalance between the spatial scope of each district and the population size.
2. Lack of uniform standards. 1984 the State Council forwarded the report of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on adjusting the standards of established towns, 1993 the State Council forwarded the report of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on adjusting the standards of establishing cities. However, the standard for setting up municipal districts has been tried for many years, but it has not been promulgated. There are some basic standards for cities to set up municipal districts. "The indicators of population, geographical area and socio-economic development level are the most basic and important three aspects in the criteria for setting up districts." From the perspective of population and geographical area, the actual scale of districts in large and medium-sized cities is quite different at present. As an intensive urban administrative region, the level of difference between municipal districts should be much lower than that of scattered and extensive rural counties, but in reality, the difference between municipal districts is not smaller than that between counties. Although it is normal for different cities to have different scales, the scale difference is too great, which not only wastes human and financial resources and increases administrative costs, but also affects urban planning and construction and economic and social development.
(D) Policy anomie
Due to the natural differences of municipal districts, it is objectively difficult to design a formatted and unified ideal management model, which also affects the formulation of normative documents on the management system of municipal districts to some extent. Therefore, so far, the adjustment of the management system of municipal districts has not been brought into the track of institutionalization and legalization, and it is basically managed by local governments according to experience. This inevitably leads to the irregular management system of each city and district. Due to the randomness and great changes in the management systems of local cities and districts, the management systems of municipal districts in different regions are obviously different, and there are also differences in the management systems of municipal districts in the same place. In this case, the superior policy has become an important factor in determining the development of municipal districts. On the one hand, the superior policy gives too little support to the municipal districts. County-level cities and counties get much more policy support from the central government, provinces and cities than municipal districts, and most of the policy support obtained by municipal districts comes from prefecture-level cities, and it depends on the economic situation of prefecture-level cities.
(5) Conflicts of interest
On the surface, the functional orientation of municipal districts is the division of management authority, but in essence it is the adjustment of interest relations. In dealing with the relationship between blocks, some places are purely based on interests. Those that can bring benefits are managed by blocks, and those that cannot bring benefits are delegated to blocks. This is a typical embodiment of profit-seeking behavior. Objectively speaking, at present, municipal finance in quite a few places, especially in the economically underdeveloped central and western regions, is still difficult, but it is difficult to solve both municipal finance and district finance in a short time. In the case that the municipal and district finances are generally not well off, the city can't just concentrate its financial resources on the ideas of the district. The appearance of excessive intervention through various rules is rooted in departmental interests. Because the new round of local institutional reform has not been fully carried out, many municipal departments still generally manage according to the planned economy model, with one-sided emphasis on rules and regulations and rigid departmental interests. Behind the interest game, municipal districts, as lower administrative units, have no right to speak, and can only obey and passively accept. The relationship between cities and municipal districts is not smooth, and the competition for interests is serious, which is one of the crux of restricting the development of municipal districts.
The sixth chapter is the countermeasures and suggestions on the functional orientation of Yandu District Government in Yancheng City.
I. Basic principles
Scientific allocation of municipal government functions should follow the following main principles:
(A) the principle of statutory functions
Legalization of government functions refers to clearly defining and fixing government responsibilities and functions in the form of laws and regulations. As far as municipal districts are concerned, it is necessary to legally clarify the scope of management of municipal districts and the corresponding rights and functions. The legalization of functions is the basic requirement of governing the country according to law, which is beneficial to the city and municipal districts in terms of functions, responsibilities and power arrangements. Adhere to the statutory principle of government functions, we should do the following: 1. Formulate a separate organic law of municipal district government, and make specific provisions on the composition, functions, authority, affiliation, establishment and change procedures of municipal districts; 2. The functions entrusted by law to the municipal districts shall be independently exercised by the municipal districts without interference from any other organs; 3. Intensify the investigation of legal responsibility for arbitrary deprivation of the functions and powers of municipal districts, and ensure the functions entrusted to the municipal district government by law; 4. The functions of municipal districts must be established, changed and revoked according to law.
The principle of the supremacy of civil rights
In a country, what is the status of civil rights, whether it is "supreme" or "inferior", which is the essential difference between modern society and traditional society. China is a socialist country, and the people are the masters of the country. Before the reform and opening up, due to the serious lag in the construction of democracy and legal system, the constitutional principle that sovereignty belongs to the people has not been well implemented. Since the reform and opening up, with the establishment of the socialist market economic system and the continuous strengthening of democracy and legal system, China is changing from the supremacy of political power to the supremacy of civil rights, and from the official standard to the people standard. This is a profound historical change in China society and an inevitable trend of social development. Therefore, the allocation and design of various functions of municipal districts should not only adapt to this change, but also actively promote this change. In today's comprehensive promotion of the rule of law, following the principle of the supremacy of civil rights not only clarifies the overall direction of government functions, but also helps to restrain government behavior and enhance its legitimacy. At the same time, it is easier to determine the power boundary of the municipal government by following this principle. Because, under the conditions of socialist market economy and democratic politics, civil rights are not only clear, but also determined according to law. The boundary of civil rights is also the boundary of government power. When exercising power and performing functions, the government should not infringe on citizens' rights, but also take safeguarding citizens' rights and constantly improving citizens' legitimate rights and interests as its primary duty.
(3) The principle of empowerment based on quantity system
The so-called quantitative empowerment is to clearly define the rights and responsibilities of departments and give them corresponding functions according to the corresponding laws and regulations and the hierarchical constraint relationship between departments, referring to and using the rules and evaluation methods of job analysis and performance management in public management. At present, the government functions of cities and municipal districts, such as "overlapping departmental functions, too fine division of departmental functions, unclear powers and responsibilities, and difficulties in coordination and cooperation", still exist to varying degrees, and should be further adjusted and optimized according to the requirements of quantitative empowerment. To adhere to the system of quantity empowerment, we need to reasonably grasp three main links: 1, and empower according to the attribute characteristics of municipal districts. Its basic requirements are: simplification, clarification, matching and correspondence. Simplification means that the functional allocation of municipal districts must be streamlined, efficient and accurate, and the overlapping of their functions should be eliminated through empowerment, so as to achieve fine, precise, coordinated and harmonious functions. Clarity is to clarify its functional relationship, draw a clear line between departments and institutions within departments, and prevent its functional relationship from being ambiguous. Matching means that the functions are connected, the relationship is clear and orderly, and the coordination effect is produced organically. Correspondence is to endow the organization with functions consistent with the hierarchy according to the hierarchical constraint relationship of the organizational structure. 2. Authorization according to the target mode and governance concept of government management. The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out: "In accordance with the goal of establishing Socialism with Chinese characteristics's administrative management system, we will further promote the separation of government from enterprises, government funds and government agencies, and build a service-oriented government with scientific functions, optimized structure, honesty and efficiency, and people's satisfaction." The new concept of government management puts forward new requirements for the allocation of government functions. The allocation of main functions, such as overall planning, planning, service, coordination, consultation and monitoring, commensurate with the concept of government governance is the concrete embodiment of the empowerment of quantity system. According to the requirements of Scientific Outlook on Development and "deepening the reform of administrative management system and building a service-oriented government", the functional orientation of government departments and institutions should be shifted to strengthening social management and public services, and the main functions such as economic regulation, market supervision and macro-control should be strengthened. 3. According to the main mandate of the transformation of government functions. One of the main tasks of transforming government functions is to speed up the "four separations". That is, to promote the separation of government from enterprises, government departments should avoid direct involvement in enterprise production and operation, and the main economic management functions should be transferred to serving market players and creating a good development environment; Promote the separation of government and capital. The government no longer assumes the function of the owner of state-owned capital, and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission implements the management of functional capital control rights for wholly state-owned and holding enterprises. Promote the separation of political affairs. Government departments must replace all public welfare undertakings with macro-control and classified guidance; To promote the separation of government and market intermediary organizations, government departments should be equipped with corresponding functions such as coordination, supervision and adjustment, and promote the socialization of public services of government departments, so that social forces and market forces can provide public services that meet the requirements of socialization under the effective coordination and supervision of the government and the Shu government.
(d) functional subordination principle
The principle of functional subordination in institutional economics is the principle of task division among governments at all levels, including the central government and local governments at all levels. It establishes the theory of fiscal decentralization and stratified supply of public goods, points out that a large number of government functions can be decentralized and undertaken by competing institutions, and advocates that every task in collective action should be placed at the lowest government level as far as possible. Brayton put forward two levels of this principle, namely, the reaction principle and the auxiliary principle. The so-called response principle means that the lower-level government in the administrative system is closer to the people and can better reflect the preferences of citizens. Therefore, only when the lower-level government is technically unable to assume the responsibility of exercising a certain power or function should it be assigned to the higher-level jurisdiction. The principle of subsidiarity means that in the structure of the administrative system, if the lower level can perform the responsibilities undertaken by the higher level to the same extent or better, it should not assign powers or functions to the higher level. Applying the above theory to the functions of cities and districts, the functions that the district government can perform are delegated to the district level, and only the macro functions of the whole city are allocated to the municipal level.