(A) local governments interfere in tax revenue and hinder tax law enforcement
Tax law enforcement is the concrete practice of administering taxes according to law in tax work, which represents the state in exercising power and performing official duties. However, in some economically underdeveloped areas, the rule of man is often greater than the rule of law, and leaders' speeches and local documents are greater than laws. It is not uncommon to formulate preferential tax policies or relevant documents and meeting minutes that violate the national tax laws, and to reduce, exempt or postpone taxes for individual enterprises without authorization, and to implement "tax package" for a long time. Especially when tax authorities clean up tax arrears and investigate tax evasion cases, some government leaders intervene on the grounds of supporting enterprise development and maintaining social stability. Due to the support of the government, some enterprises that owe taxes have smaller cars, bigger houses and more fines. The state can simply refuse to pay taxes, or even openly say that "owing taxes gives benefits".
(2) Departmental policy interests interfere with tax enforcement.
Departmental policy interests have become a prominent social issue. In order to maximize the interests of their own departments and small groups, some power departments have tried their best to distort administrative actions, formulated and introduced some charging policies, and continued to charge fees for fees that have been explicitly cancelled by the state. According to relevant statistics, the price bureau and supervision department of a province in Northeast China organized a major inspection of administrative fees, involving 22 units in the whole province 14 cities, and found out that illegal fees were10.70 billion yuan, and some power departments even adopted monopoly means to generate income. Due to the high fees, the ability of enterprises to expand reproduction and accumulation is greatly reduced. In addition, the cross-collection of taxes and fees and the charging of tax vehicles have blurred taxpayers' understanding, resulting in some taxpayers not understanding, not cooperating or even disgusted with the normal tax enforcement of tax authorities. The "hard" tax plan weakens tax enforcement.
For a long time, some local governments have not made tax plans according to the local economic base and tax sources, but have adopted the method of "determining expenditures by revenue" according to the needs of local finance. The national tax only requires a slight increase in the "base", while the local tax is "Han Xin has more soldiers, the more the better". In order to complete the tax task, tax authorities at all levels and local governments generally adopt administrative means of tax planning, such as signing a letter of responsibility with higher authorities at the beginning of the year, incorporating it into target management, implementing a "one-vote veto" on tax tasks, and linking funds. In some places with backward economy and poor tax sources, some government leaders link the completion of tax tasks with the "hat" of township leaders. In order to keep the official hat, some township leaders do whatever it takes, which leads to excessive collection, expenditure and tax collection. (D) The low professional quality of tax cadres has affected tax law enforcement.
Tax law enforcement requires law enforcers to have skilled professional ability and strong awareness of the rule of law in order to correctly perform their duties. However, with the further deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, most small and medium-sized enterprises have been restructured, and a large number of enterprises have been transformed into private ownership. Tax evasion will be directly transformed into personal wealth. It is a common way for enterprises to hire accountants and certified public accountants to make false accounts and carry out so-called "reasonable tax avoidance". If tax cadres are not familiar with their own business, they can't look at the accounts when they go to the enterprise, let alone audit the accounts, so they can only audit the accounts. The struggle between tax evasion and anti-tax evasion, tax avoidance and anti-tax avoidance is a topic that tax authorities are facing at present and in the future. At the same time, tax law enforcement personnel lack training in legal procedures, especially other tax-related laws, and their ability to solve problems correctly is not strong. Paying more attention to entity than procedure is also an important factor for tax authorities to be pushed to the dock.
Lax collection and management, ineffective crackdown on tax-related cases, and laissez-faire tax violations.
The authenticity and accuracy of the basic data of collection and management is the premise to improve the quality of collection and management. In practical work, the basic data of tax collection and management are chaotic, with low reliability and poor usability. In management, most tax collection and management units are a mere formality, passively accepting all kinds of tax-related information from taxpayers, and basically accepting everything submitted and declared by enterprises as much as possible, rarely conducting on-the-spot investigation and comprehensive analysis on the authenticity and rationality of enterprise tax information and basic information, and lacking dynamic tracking management. For example, the implementation of audit collection on some catering industries will eventually lead to the loss of state tax revenue and encourage tax evasion. When dealing with tax-related cases, it is not strictly in accordance with the provisions of the tax collection and management law, but instead of punishment, punishment is replaced by punishment.