First, Shenzhen Huatong Electric Construction Bureau Engineering Agency in a paper mill expansion project to install the trestle bridge inclined beam, because the inclined beam is not welded, hook removal, about 3t heavy inclined beam toppled over, so that the four workers fell from a height of 10 m, one of them did not wear a safety belt to stand in the inclined beam, the second person, although wearing a safety belt, but the safety belt hanging in the inclined beam, the two people fell dead; third person is wearing a safety belt, but not fastened, squatting on the side of the welding; the fourth person wearing a safety belt fastened firmly, two people fell to death! The third person is wearing a safety belt, but not fastened, squatting on the side of the beam welding; the fourth person is wearing a safety belt in a solid place, the two fell, the former lucky to fall on the soft soil, seriously injured, the latter safety belt to hang him in the air, he was only slightly injured. Analyze the violation of the above incident.
Second, Tianjin Chuangye Chemical Factory is a village enterprise producing hexabromo-2,4-dinitroaniline. The factory has only one large plant, divided into three workshops; the east workshop to produce intermediate products 2,4-dinitroaniline, the intermediate workshop for the preparation of materials, stacked bags of strong oxidizing agent sodium chlorate, bromide, and 2,4-dinitroaniline. 4:00 p.m. on January 26, 1996 half, some people found that the plant plant in the middle of the window of the smoke, shouting fire, was in the plant, and the factory was in the middle of the window, and the fire. The director of the factory, who was in the factory office, and the workers in the dormitory, as well as the villagers in the neighborhood, all rushed to put out the fire. They found that the preparation workshop of sodium chlorate smoke, so from the plant about a dozen meters away from the waste water pond to carry water to extinguish the fire, splashed a few buckets after the ineffective, the plant manager will call people to quickly transport the sand to extinguish the fire, did not wait for the sand to the arrival of the sand, only to listen to the two loud bangs, a black smoke straight to the sky, an area of about 500 square meters of the plant has been razed to the ground, to come to put out the fire of the workers and the villagers were killed 19 people, 14 people were injured, and the direct economic losses of 120 million yuan.
Please analyze the cause of the accident and the preventive measures to be taken.
Third, the township coal mine gas explosion
A township coal mine design annual output of 30,000 tons, the actual annual output of 60,000 t. Vertical shaft pioneering, the central boundary type ventilation.
The mine manager and special operators without a license. The phenomenon of three violations is serious. There is no pre-shift meeting and shift handover system, and there is no unified arrangement and record of underground operation tasks and personnel arrangements.
The mine's underground storage of materials and fire-fighting equipment is chaotic; the consistent use of coal faces and coal blocks to block the gun holes; the phenomenon of using cable open joints to fire guns occurs from time to time.
The mine's coal dust is explosive. There are no dust control sprinkler facilities or dust control measures in the underground, resulting in the accumulation of coal dust in the underground. On the day of the incident, a diesel generator was used to send electricity downhole after a power outage at 8:30 am. Due to the lack of electricity, the north wing working face and the south wing working face were produced in turn. 72 people went down the well at 14:00 shift***. After the workers of the south wing working face went down the well, the coal came out after hitting the eye and releasing the first shot. The pump was turned on and the electricity in the south wing was stopped at about 30:00 coincidentally, when the main fan engine and the local fan were not turned on. 17:30 when the whole mine came on, the main fan and the local fan were still not turned on. The gas inspector missed the inspection on an empty shift. North wing working face to hit the eye after the release of the second gun, the face of the mouth of the 2 m hanging on the backboard of the 11 electric detonator trailing lead line was dragged by the cable open joints contact detonation, causing gas and coal dust explosion accident. *** death 26 people, 10 people injured, direct economic losses of 380,000 yuan (current value).
Question:
1. Try to analyze the direct and indirect causes of this accident according to the above information.
2. According to the "Work Safety Law" to put forward preliminary treatment recommendations.
3. Suggest measures to prevent similar accidents.
Fourth, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, Xingye Garment Factory "5.30" fire accident
In the early morning of May 30, 1991, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, Shipai Town, Tianbian management area of the village of the individual (titled collective) Wang Mouyi Wang Mouyi two couples of Xingye Garment Factory (processing enterprises), a large fire occurred. Occurred a huge fire, the whole factory went up in flames, resulting in 72 deaths, 47 people were injured, direct economic losses amounted to 3 million yuan.
During 1989, Wang Mou two couples self-financed a four-story factory building. In November of the same year in the name of Wang Mou two signed a business license to start Shipai Town, Xingye Garment Factory, and signed a processing agreement with the Hong Kong three Yu company, the production of plastic raincoats. Thereafter, in the recruitment of workers, production, management, etc. by Wang Mouyi is responsible for. After putting into production, production workshops, warehouses, workers' dormitories in the same building, raw materials, finished products, waste materials, flammable items placed haphazardly.
On May 20, overtime worker Liang Mou smoked and threw down the cigarette to ignite flammable materials. At about 4:20 that morning, the plant suddenly caught fire on the first floor, stored in the floor of a large number of production raw materials PVC plastic sheeting and finished raincoats more than 70,000 pieces on fire, the fire spread rapidly and sealed the only exit of the four-story plant. There is no fire hydrant, fire extinguishers and other minimum firefighting equipment in the building, there is no fire evacuation routes and emergency exits, but also a lot of doors and windows are welded with iron bars, resulting in the workers to fight the fire powerless to escape from the door. Thick smoke and flames ran down the stairs and elevator shafts into the workers' dormitories on the third and fourth floors. At that time, many workers were asleep in the building, not waiting to wake up or do not know what happened here, was smoked or burned to death, ultimately resulting in 64 people directly smoked and burned to death, 55 people jumped from the window to escape. Escapees, two people fell to their deaths on the spot, six people fell and burned too badly, and died after resuscitation. *** counted 72 people died.
For the above accident cases, analyze the direct causes, indirect causes, responsible parties, corrective measures.
Fifth, the Shenzhen City, "8. 5" large explosion and fire accident
August 5, 1993 at 13:26, Shenzhen Anmao dangerous goods storage and transportation company (hereinafter referred to as the Anmao company) in the Qingshui River chemical hazardous materials warehouse occurred in a large explosion. The explosion caused a fire, and an hour later a second strong explosion occurred in the fire area, causing wider destruction and fire. The Shenzhen Municipal Government immediately organized thousands of firefighters, public security officers, armed police, People's Liberation Army (PLA) commanders and medical personnel to participate in the rescue and relief work. Thanks to correct decision-making, decisive command, and the full support of many parties, the fire was finally extinguished at 5:00 a.m. on August 6th. The accident caused 15 deaths, more than 200 people were injured, including 25 seriously injured, direct economic losses of 250 million yuan.
According to the investigation, the accident occurred in the unit is China Foreign Trade Development Group Corporation under the storage and transportation company and the Shenzhen Dangerous Goods Service Center joint venture Anmao Dangerous Goods Storage and Transportation Joint Company. Explosion site is located in the northeast corner of Shenzhen City, covers an area of about two thousand square meters of Qingshuihe warehouse district Qing six flat warehouse, of which six warehouses (2 # - 7 # warehouse) was completely destroyed, leaving the scene of the two 7 m deep pits, the rest of the 1 # warehouse and 8 # warehouse was seriously damaged. Immediately adjacent to the six warehouses of the storage of 240 tons of hydrogen peroxide warehouse and storage of 8 large tanks, 41 horizontal tanks of liquefied petroleum gas station and just arrived in the 28 wagonloads of liquefied petroleum gas, a gas station did not explode. Otherwise, the city of Shenzhen will cause greater losses.
August 5, 13:10 pm, 4 # warehouse administrator found that the warehouse stacked ammonium persulfate smoke, fire, because the fire fighting facilities without water, with a fire extinguisher fire did not extinguish. Telephone alarm, "119" can not be connected. So, the security guards rushed to intercept a car to go to shoot the police. The Shenzhen Municipal Public Security Bureau Fire Department duty officer received the alarm, that is, the transfer of shoots Gang Fire Brigade fire trucks to extinguish the fire. Shortly after the fire truck drove out (13:26), the first explosion occurred in the combustible materials stacked in the 4# warehouse, completely destroying the 2#, 3# and 4# contiguous warehouses, and the powerful shockwave damaged the nearby warehouses, exposing a variety of chemical hazardous materials to the flames. Hearing the explosion, the head of the City Fire Department first thought of the nearby liquefied petroleum gas tanks warehouse, and immediately mobilized the nearest fire brigades to rush to the scene. 11 fire engines from 5 fire brigades arrived at the fire point within 15 minutes. The leadership of the Fire Services Department at the scene quickly set up a fire command, to participate in the squadron combatants to mobilize before the war, while developing emergency measures. All firefighters stood bravely in front of the fire and fought bravely. As the dangerous goods were in the state of being continuously heated, about 1 hour later, at 14:27, 5#, 6#, 7# connected warehouse the second explosion occurred. The blast shockwave caused wider damage, and the fire-carrying fallout from the explosion (e.g., yellow phosphorus, burning plywood, and other combustibles) caused the fire to spread and expand rapidly, igniting 3,000 m of wood flooring blocks in the lumber yard at 250 m from the center of the explosion, six four-story dry storage bins at 300 m, and trees on three hilltops at 400 - 500 m. The explosion also caused the fire to spread and expand rapidly, setting fire to 3,000 m of the wood yard at 250 m from the center of the explosion. Meanwhile, several firefighters who were closest to the scene died heroically and many comrades were injured. However, firefighters and armed police fighters were not afraid of danger and still tried their best to fight the fire. At night, Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Dongguan, Zhuhai, Huizhou, Foshan, Qingyuan City, more than 100 fire trucks came to reinforce, after nearly 10,000 public security and firefighting, border guards and PLA chemical defense soldiers 16 h of fighting, at 5:00 a.m. on August 6, the fire was basically extinguished.
For the above accident cases, analyze the direct causes, indirect causes, responsible parties, and corrective measures.
Reference Answer
Practice Test Questions (2)
I. Answer Key Points
(1) lifting operations should be required to check the quality of the weld seam before taking off the hook, and can only be taken off the hook after meeting the safety requirements;
(2) 3 people working at heights did not use the correct use of safety belts in accordance with the provisions of the regulations;
(3) the lack of on-site supervision and checking of the safety supervisors Supervision and inspection;
(4) strengthen the education of safety compliance.
Second, the answer to the key points
This is a large casualty caused by the enterprise did not follow the provisions of the storage of chemical materials, fire-fighting measures are not appropriate.
Sodium chlorate is a strong oxidizer, to be dry and solid iron drum packaging, inside, but also add a layer of plastic bags and kraft paper for moisture. Strong oxidizing agent alone does not spontaneous combustion, but if it and organic matter together, it will decomposition reaction to release heat. In this case, the packaging of sodium chlorate in the Venture Chemical Factory is a plastic bag inside and a woven bag outside. When the workers were shoveling the material, they inevitably scattered the sodium chlorate outside. A few days before the accident, Tianjin sustained high temperature, the 26th outdoor temperature of 33 ℃, the plant roof is asbestos tiles, poor insulation, the temperature inside the plant reached 40 ℃, the plastic bag and woven bag itself is organic, so strong oxidizing agent and organic matter at high temperatures under the oxidation reaction exothermic, heat and accelerate the oxidation reaction, resulting in the burning of the woven bag, ignited next to the pile of wood, black smoke. As the factory manager and workers use the acidic water in the waste water pond to extinguish the fire, the strong oxidizer sodium chlorate acid reaction produces a large amount of chloric acid, chlorine at 40 ℃ will explode, the first loud bang is the chloric acid heat explosion. And because the preparation workshop at the same time stacked 2, 4 a dinitroaniline, it meets the high temperature and high pressure gas shock explosion, resulting in the second loud noise, resulting in the destruction of the plant.
Prevention: should be strictly enforced national "Regulations on the Safe Management of Dangerous Chemicals" provisions. According to the relevant provisions of the state, the chemical nature of the chemical hazardous materials contradict each other can not be stored in the same room. Venture chemical plant in violation of the provisions of the strong oxidizing agent sodium chlorate with organic packaging and storage of organic materials in the same workshop caused by the accident potential, so as to cause a major disaster.
Third, answer key
1. direct and indirect causes
Direct causes:
(1) because the mine's main fan and fan fan are not open, poor ventilation, resulting in a local accumulation of gas;
(2) the mine's coal seam is dry and explosive coal dust, and the mine did not take water sprinkling and other dust measures, resulting in the accumulation of coal dust;
(2) the mine is dry and coal dust, and the mine did not take water sprinkler and other dust measures, resulting in the accumulation of coal dust;
(3) the mine is dry, and coal dust, but the mine did not take water sprinkler.
(3) underground pyrotechnics and power generation equipment management chaos, improper storage of electric detonators, cables with open joints, so that in the drag cable open joints touch the electric detonator foot line caused detonator explosion (i.e., ignition source), which led to the gas and coal dust explosion.
Indirect causes:
(1) the mine manager and special operators (including gas inspectors) do not have safety qualifications, in violation of the "Mine Safety Law", "Work Safety Law", "Coal Mine Safety Regulations" of the relevant provisions;
(2) the gas inspectors negligence, empty shifts and missed inspections;
(3) the mine's safety management is insufficient, as shown in the Many aspects, such as:
① safety management system is not sound, such as the absence of pre-shift meeting and shift handover system;
② three violations of the phenomenon is serious, such as from time to time violations of the discharge of artillery has not been corrected;
③ underground material placed in a chaotic;
④ the mine from the mine manager to the workers of the safety awareness and the level of safety management is low, reflecting the lack of safety education and training and so on.
(4) The mine's safety awareness and safety management level from the mine manager to the workers are not high, reflecting insufficient safety education and training, etc.
(4) The local supervisory and management departments of work safety and the coal mine safety supervision departments are not effective in supervision and monitoring.
2. Handling recommendations
(1) According to Article 81 of the Work Safety Law, based on the facts and circumstances, the main person in charge of the mine will be held legally responsible:
(2) According to Article 90 of the Work Safety Law, based on the facts and circumstances, the relevant person in charge of the mine, management personnel, and other practitioners of the mine will be held legally responsible;
(3) According to Articles 82 and 93 of the Work Safety Law, the mine shall be administratively punished;
(4) The local supervisory and management departments of work safety and coal mine safety supervision departments are ineffective in supervising and monitoring, and they failed to stop the illegal behavior of the mine manager and the operators of the special equipments who were working without certificates in a timely manner, so they should be held administratively responsible.
3. Measures recommended
(1) Supervision and management of production safety should be in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and systems for coal mine qualification review, resolutely stop illegal or do not have the conditions for safe production of small coal mines;
(2) Supervision and management of production safety should be in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations. (3) Strengthen the safety management of coal mines, including the establishment of a sound production safety responsibility system and other necessary safety rules and regulations, safety operating procedures, etc., and strictly enforce them;
(4) Strengthen the safety education and training of the main person in charge of the mining enterprise and all the employees, and the head of the mine and the special operators should obtain the qualification certificate according to the law.
(5) strengthen mine ventilation, gas management, take watering and dust control measures to prevent gas accumulation and coal dust accumulation;
(6) strengthen the management of pyrotechnics and electrical equipment, to eliminate the use of cables with open joints phenomenon.
Fourth, answer key
1. direct cause
(1) the unsafe state of things
① "three in one": production workshops, warehouses, workers' dormitories in the same building;
② raw materials, finished products, waste, flammable items placed indiscriminately;
③ no fire prevention in the building. p> ③ no fire hydrant, fire extinguishers and other minimum fire fighting equipment in the building;
④ no fire evacuation routes and emergency exits, many doors and windows are welded with iron bars.
(2) Human unsafe behavior
① In the workplace where there are a lot of flammable materials, overtime worker Liang smoked and threw cigarettes;
② Emergency jumping to escape from the building in the wrong way.
2. Indirect causes (management reasons)
(1) Wang Mouyi:
The above direct causes are due to Wang Mouyi does not pay attention to safety, safety management is chaotic.
(2) Shipai town, Tianbian management area:
The town and the management area of the many "three capitals", "three to one" enterprises are the existence of safety management chaos phenomenon: the safety management organization is not or is not sound, the plant design, construction and Put into production without the safety authorities to examine the layout is not reasonable. Safety facilities are not complete; there is no strict production safety measures and regulations, violation of operating procedures is common; workplace accidents are more hidden dangers. It shows that the supervision and management of production safety is very inadequate.
3. Responsible
(1) directly responsible for overtime workers Liangmou;
(2) the leadership responsible for Wangmou, Wangmou two; Shipai town, Tianbian management area responsible for production safety leaders, the government's main person in charge;
(3) the main responsible for person in charge.
4. Corrective and preventive measures
(1) Xingye Garment Factory:
Change the phenomenon of "three-in-one"; establish and improve the safety management organization or set up a full-time or part-time staff; the establishment and improvement of safety systems and operating procedures; elimination of hidden dangers of accidents in the workplace; strengthen safety education and training.
(2)
(2) Shipai Town, Tianbian Management District:
Correct the understanding of the production safety management policy, in the development of the economy at the same time pay full attention to production safety, to ensure that sufficient personnel, time, strengthen the supervision and management of all aspects of production safety and strengthen the safety of production investment.
V. Answer key
1. direct cause
(1) the unsafe state of things
① 4 # warehouse mixing of oxidizing and reducing agents, contact, intense redox reactions, the formation of heat build-up, resulting in a fire burn, explosion;
② Qingshuihe Warehouse District, the overall layout of the irrational, flammable, explosive, highly toxic chemical Hazardous materials warehouses, livestock and food warehouses and liquefied petroleum gas storage tanks and other facilities, centrally located in the area with the settlements and traffic roads do not meet the safety distance regulations;
③ no fire water.
(2) human unsafe behavior
Warehousers and porters only according to the size of the remaining space in the warehouse to determine the location of storage and storage, mixed storage and loading habit. Dangerous goods receiving and unloading process, not in accordance with standardized procedures.
2. Indirect causes (management reasons)
(1) An Trade Company:
① In order to fraudulently obtain a license to operate chemical hazardous materials storage and transportation, in the feasibility study report to the city government, intentionally non-compliant with the safety regulations of the dry grocery flat warehouse said that it is in line with the safety of hazardous materials warehouse, and illegal to change to a warehouse for chemical hazardous substances;
② not according to the approval of the type of storage of dangerous goods required approval of the type of dangerous goods stored in the provisions of the serious mixed storage of various types of chemical hazardous materials. The arrival of goods before the temporary designated warehouse stacking phenomenon occurs.
③ After receiving the fire hazard notice, not according to the notice requirements for rectification, not to eliminate the major hazards.
(2) Shenzhen Municipal Government and relevant departments
① Municipal government on the general layout of the warehouse area in Qingshuihe did not review the relevant national safety regulations;
② Municipal government did not strictly review the report of the application for the establishment of the Anmao Dangerous Goods Company in accordance with the provisions of the relevant national safety laws and regulations promulgated by the municipal government on the basis of the Shenzhen Municipal Government Office [1990] No. 688, "On the Establishment of the Shenzhen Anmao Dangerous Goods Storage and Transportation Company" approved the establishment of Anmao;
③ the Municipal Public Security Bureau did not strictly examine the report of the application for the establishment of Anmao Dangerous Goods Company in accordance with the provisions of the relevant safety regulations promulgated by the State, and then issued Anmao Dangerous Goods Company with the Guangdong Province Explosives Storage License, the Storage License of Highly Poisonous Substances, and the Shenzhen City Explosives and Dangerous Goods Receiving and Discharging and Transferring License, legitimizing the operation of the company with explosives and other dangerous goods, without the required security conditions. The company's operation of civil explosives without having the safety conditions stipulated by the state is legalized; the fire department of the Municipal Public Security Bureau has not carried out any supervision and rectification after issuing the notice of rectification of hidden fire hazards.
④ Municipal Public Security Bureau violated the rules to participate in the operation of the company, its subordinate explosives and dangerous goods service company in the company has a 20% stake in the security trade.
3. Responsible
(1) directly responsible for the main person in charge of Anmao company;
(2) the leadership responsible for the Shenzhen Municipal Government, the Municipal Public Security Bureau;
(3) the main responsible for the main person in charge of Anmao company, the Shenzhen Municipal Public Security Bureau.
4. Corrective and preventive measures
(1) Dangerous Goods Warehouse re-location and rational layout;
(2) According to the compatibility of chemicals, according to the relevant laws and regulations, standards, storage of chemicals;
(3) The Shenzhen Municipal Government and the relevant departments:
① The Municipal Public Security Bureau to remove the corruption, and does not have any interest in any company;
(3) The Shenzhen Municipal Government and the relevant departments:
① Municipal Public Security Bureau to remove corruption, not to any company to have an interest;
② the approval of the application, licensing, and the general layout of the storage site related to hazardous chemicals, and the strict implementation of the relevant regulations and standards;
③ the implementation of the regulations on the units related to hazardous chemicals to carry out rigorous inspections, and after the issuance of the notice of rectification of fire hazards to verify the rectification situation.