Xinhuanet Gansu Channel (07-28 09:59:55) Source:
bright red
Going north to resist Japan is a clear policy of China. On the eve of the Long March of the Central Red Army, that is, in July of 1934 and 15, the Central Government of chinese soviet republic and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army issued the Declaration of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army's northward Anti-Japanese War, which pointed out: "The Soviet government and the workers and peasants Red Army spared no effort to send an anti-Japanese advance team northward with the greatest determination" to carry out the people's national revolutionary struggle and overthrow Japanese imperialism. However, the policy of going north to resist Japan was gradually realized in the Long March.
The proposal of rendezvous thought
At the beginning of 1934, after the Guangchang campaign, it was extremely unlikely that the Central Red Army would crush the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" in the base area. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also estimated this situation. Therefore, in May of 1934, the Secretariat of the Central Committee made a decision to evacuate the main force of the Red Army from the central base area and report to the Comintern. Soon, the Comintern agreed to this transfer plan. According to Zhou Enlai's memory in 1943, before the Long March, the Secretariat of the Central Committee held several meetings to study the establishment of a three-member group and the arrangement of personnel to stay or stay. However, Bo Gu and Li De blindly joined forces with the Red Army Corps and the Sixth Army Corps and failed to make a strategic shift in time. The transfer plan was only carried out in secret among a few senior leaders, and even Mao Zedong, chairman of the Soviet Central Government of China, didn't know about it until the transfer of troops began. Judging from the available materials, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission are hesitant on this issue and are not fully prepared to rush out. Withdrawing from the Central Soviet Area, a major issue concerning the future and destiny of the Party and the revolution, was not discussed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Most of the orders and instructions for transfer were "absolutely confidential" and it was strictly forbidden to convey them to cadres and troops. Without ideological mobilization and full preparation, it will be difficult to act in unity with an army of 86,000 people. Therefore, "it shows unnecessary haste". Because the military region simply meets with the Red Army Corps and the Sixth Army Corps, the marching route is basically the marching route taken by the Red Army Corps. Due to the slow action of the troops, after the Kuomintang authorities noticed it, they built four blockade lines in Gannan, Xiangyue, Southeast Hunan and Xianggui, and arranged heavy troops to intercept and chase them. After the Central Red Army broke through the Xiangjiang River, the number of people dropped sharply from 86,000 at the time of departure to more than 30,000. At this time, there was an argument within the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Mao Zedong, Wang Jiayang and Zhang Wentian criticized the central military line and thought that the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was caused by the wrong military leadership line. 65438+February 65438+February, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China * * * held an emergency meeting to discuss the direction of the Red Army. Bo Gu Kailai and Li De insisted on the plan that the main force of the Red Army would meet with the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps.
Establish Sichuan-Guizhou and Yunguichuan base areas
1934 18 February 18 the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee held a meeting in Liping, Guizhou, to continue discussing the red army's course of action. Bo Gu Kailai and Li De still adhere to the rendezvous plan with the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps. Mao Zedong advocated that the Red Army March to the northwest of Guizhou and establish a base area on the border of Sichuan and Guizhou. After a heated debate, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian and others agreed with Mao Zedong. Zhou Enlai, the host of the meeting, adopted Mao Zedong's opinion and decided that the Red Army would cross the Wujiang River to the west and move forward to the northwest of Guizhou. The meeting also adopted the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee's decision on strategic policy. This is the first time since the Long March that the decision to establish a new base area has been clearly put forward.
1935 65438+ 10, Zunyi meeting changed the decision of Liping meeting on establishing base areas in Sichuan and Guizhou. The meeting decided to establish a new base area in southwest Sichuan or northwest Sichuan to welcome the Red Fourth Army in the north. Because it was impossible to cross the river, the central government decided to stop developing to the north of Sichuan and establish a base area in Yunguichuan. Under the correct command of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission with Mao Zedong at the core, the Central Red Army adopted flexible strategies and tactics, galloping across the vast areas of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, and weaving among enemy heavy groups. I've been fighting here for half a year, but I haven't found a suitable base. Obviously, the Red Army moved to the southwest, trekking in Guizhou, Sichuan and its surrounding areas, which was flexible and maneuverable militarily, but it was actually a necessity. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly realized that the troops were in a guerrilla state for a long time, and it was extremely dangerous to have no base areas. Therefore, troops are always required to fight and create new base areas. To sum up, the failure of the Red Army to establish a base area in the southwest is basically due to two reasons: one is that the enemy is strong, and the other is that the mass base is weak. This is because, although the southwest is remote, it is still a densely populated area, where warlords are separated and many soldiers are raised. In addition to the Guizhou army, the Sichuan army and the Yunnan army have certain combat effectiveness. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek deliberately managed the southwest and sent an army to follow, forcing warlords from all over the southwest to unite and fight the Red Army very actively, thus making the Red Army in a difficult situation of fighting almost all the time. At the same time, due to the limited strength, the losses of long-distance battles continued, and the combat effectiveness of the Red Army was weakened, so it had to avoid the reality and avoid a decisive battle with a strong enemy. Therefore, the Red Army had to move to the border of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan and the plateau mountainous areas of western Sichuan, trying to find a foothold in the weak areas of the enemy. However, people in these areas are mostly ethnic minorities, and people's feelings are divided everywhere. In addition, the relationship between ethnic minorities and Han people in these areas has been tense, which makes it difficult for the Red Army not only to gain a foothold, but also to solve the problems of supply and manpower. Based on the above reasons, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China finally decided to change the policy of western expedition in June 1935.
The Red Army went north to establish the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area.
The policy of going north was put forward after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China noticed that there was no possibility of establishing base areas in the southwest. Why didn't you mention the policy of going north when you retired from Jiangxi? As mentioned above, although the Central Committee has not made it clear in many resolutions, it will eventually go north. Therefore, after the first and fourth armies joined forces, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee held a meeting in Lianghekou on June 26th. 1935. Zhou Enlai made a report at the meeting, and put forward the strategic policy of rapidly attacking Songpan's Hu Zongnan department with mobile warfare and establishing Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area with the whole army going north. According to the spirit of the two estuaries, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee adopted the "Decision on the Strategic Policy after the First and Fourth Armies Meet". It is decided to require the first and fourth armies to concentrate their main forces on developing northward at present and destroy a large number of enemies by mobile warfare. First of all, the southern part of Gansu was captured, the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area was established, and the Soviet movement in China was placed on a more solid and broad foundation, thus winning the victory in the northwest provinces of China and even the whole country. After the meeting, Liu Bocheng drafted the battle plan of Songpan for the Central Revolutionary Committee. The plan stipulates that the first and fourth armies will March into the northwest region in three ways, "to eliminate the Hu enemies in Songpan area and control the roads north and northeast of Songpan, so as to facilitate the northward operation and development." However, under the pretext that the "organizational problem" has not been satisfactorily solved, Zhang repeatedly delayed the fighter plane, which led to Hu Zongnan's concentration of troops in Songpan and put the Red Army in a dangerous situation between Scylla and Charybdis. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Zhongge Military Commission decided to cancel the battle plan of Songpan, and the Red Army went north via grassland.
The Red Army continued northward, creating the Shaanxi-Gansu base area.
Zhang disobeyed the Central Committee's policy of going north and insisted on going south, saying that "the left and right roads must never split up", but behind the central telegram, he ordered Chen Changhao to lead the right army south in an attempt to endanger the CPC Central Committee. The CPC Central Committee called Zhang many times and asked him to lead the right army to move northward quickly. Zhang exaggerated the enemy's strength and despised his own, which made him lose confidence in creating a new Soviet area in the northwest of the front line of the Anti-Japanese War and advocated retreating to the Sichuan-Kangbian border area. In response to the current crisis, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in Russian territory on September 1935. This meeting raised a question that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has been reluctant to raise since the Long March, that is, to create base areas near the Soviet Union. CCP is a branch of the Comintern, so it is very risky to act rashly without the approval of the Comintern. However, the central government is not only considering the establishment of base areas here, but also absolutely protecting thousands of revolutionary forces that have passed through the Long March. In order to carry out this policy, the Central Committee also decided to send Xie Juezai and Mao Zemin to Xinjiang to set up traffic stations in an attempt to open up international relations. At this time, Mao Zedong learned from the Kuomintang newspaper in Hadapu that there are quite a large Soviet area and a considerable number of Red Army in northern Shaanxi, which is very important for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, the decision to establish a base near the Soviet Union was changed.
The Central Red Army settled in northern Shaanxi and completed the original plan of going north to resist Japan.
1On September 22nd, 935, Mao Zedong made a speech and pointed out: The national crisis is deepening day by day, so we must continue to act and complete the original plan of going northward to resist Japan. On September 27th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Shaanxi-Gansu detachment arrived in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, Gansu Province, where the CPC The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) Conference was held. According to what we have learned, the meeting changed the decision of the Russian border meeting on September 12 to establish a base area near the Soviet Union, and decided to put the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Shaanxi-Gansu detachment in northern Shaanxi. There is no doubt that the decision made by the central authorities half a month ago was a last resort. Of course, this does not mean that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will not open up international air routes. At this time, according to the decision of the CPC Central Committee, Bo Gukai wrote The Development of Soviet Movement in Shaanxi and the Task of Our Detachment. The article discusses the significance of staying in northern Shaanxi in detail, pointing out that "in Shaanxi and Gansu, especially in northern Shaanxi, there is an amazing vigorous development. Undoubtedly, this development, its significance, and its importance are not limited to Shaanxi, nor to the northwest, but a major event in the political life of China. " It is "the beginning and the first sound of the whole northwest". Therefore, we should "defend and expand the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi". After the meeting in Bangluo Town, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China led the Shaanxi-Gansu detachment to continue northward, crossed Liupan Mountain, broke through the blockade lines of Guyuan and Pingliang in the last stage of the Long March, arrived in Wuqi, northern Shaanxi, and joined the Red Army in northern Shaanxi on June 65438+1October 65438+September, thus realizing the initial intention of the central government to create a northwest base area. 10 year 10 On October 22nd, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee held a meeting and approved the decision of Bangluo town meeting, pointing out that "establishing Soviet area in northwest China and leading the national revolution" is the strategic task of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army in the future. Mao Zedong pointed out at the meeting, "Now the National Revolutionary General Command is here and has become the center of counter-revolutionary attacks. The enemy's pursuit and interception of us had to come to an end. " Our task is to "defend and expand the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi and lead the national revolution together with the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi". The establishment of the base area in northern Shaanxi promoted the rapid development of the revolutionary situation in China. With the arrival of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants in northern Shaanxi, the people of China began a new historical stage of the national revolutionary war.