-Do we care about "justice" or "utopia"?

The Republic takes the form of dialogue as a whole, and begins with a scene introduction, greeting and prologue that slightly confuses readers. It seems that it has little to do with the theme and is not meaningless. Dialogue, especially daily dialogue, is closer to the essence of wisdom and the political animal-human nature that politics (political philosophy) pays attention to. The world we live in every day, not rational people, the veil of ignorance or the assumptions imagined by other wise people, is what we need to pay attention to.

At the beginning of this conversation, Socrates and Dick fallows changed from talking about life to discussing "justice". G. fallows and his successor Polemahoz seem to have reached a tacit understanding with the Su family that telling the truth is not the essential element of justice (33 1b-332, G. fallows began to think that "justice" means "telling the truth" and "repaying the debts that should be repaid", but he immediately stopped insisting, and Polemahoz automatically gave up this view). As a foreshadowing, this point is actually mentioned in the whole Republic. It can even be said that the ideal city-state can only be built by philosophers through lying. So, will the means of lying evolve into an end? Su Can said confidently that this is not within the scope of "justice".

G. fallows's hazy view of justice seems worthy of attention, because when Socrates suddenly found out where the justice of the polis was, what he said "do your own work" coincided with what G. fallows said, that is, everyone got what he deserved, and it was where he should be. Does this explain the correctness of this view of justice from another angle? After all, it is impossible to put forward a view close to the truth without the approval of an ordinary person, because it is such a person who constitutes our world.

Telling the truth is not the basic element of justice, but justice is one of the principles of the Republic. It is necessary for those who uphold justice to take advantage of people's ignorance and guide them to a "better" life with illusions. In essence, the agreement on this point is based on two premises that are generally recognized by human beings and a hypothesis that is still controversial. The premise is: 1, most human beings are ignorant, such as people in caves, who can't realize the truth; 2. One of the basic values pursued by human beings is happiness. The question is: Is happiness an ultimate value? (Bentham seems to answer "yes" confidently, but is this from the original intention of a thinker like him? Is there a uniform standard for happiness? In addition, the most concerned point is: does happiness lie in an extraordinary existence (gods, prophets, philosophers) guiding ordinary people forward, and these "superhuman" can do whatever it takes (even transform human nature) on the way, without asking why? The Republic seems to show that this is unrealistic.

The justice advocated by fallows and Polemahos lies in giving back everything that belongs to him to others. However, in some cases, it is unwise to give others what belongs to him. Not everyone is good at using his property and possessions. Socrates' clever refutation seems to imply the premise of justice and benefit. Indeed, if justice is beneficial, we are forced to ask everyone to have only "moderate" things (because it is beneficial to them). (formerly 332)

Also around here is the question just now: Do people need the guidance of rulers to move towards "happiness"? In fact, if Socrates' implication (that justice is beneficial) does not hold, that is, justice exists independently of "happiness", this problem may be solved to some extent. In fact, there is a dispute between "right" and "benefit", and classical political thought obviously tends to the latter.

Salazar Máthōs appeared in the debate at this time, and brought a rude but extremely powerful view: justice is the interest of the rulers. In this way, justice is no different from what is law, which is the so-called "legal conventionalism" in modern times. The source of justice is the will of legislators.

Socrates immediately grasped one point keenly: rulers make mistakes. Since the ruler's will infringes on his interests after making a mistake, isn't justice something that infringes on the ruler's interests?

Sarah Máthōs may have neglected Socrates' stealing of "will" and "interest" (more likely, he didn't solve this problem himself), but adopted the method of changing the definition of "ruler" and defined "rule" as a technology in an extremely strict sense. Socrates immediately retorted that technology in the strict sense actually cares about the interests of others.

In fact, Socrates has put forward an important principle in the Republic: justice comes from strict technology: when everyone does his job well and gives full play to his technology, the greatest public interest, that is, justice, can be realized.

Sarasu Máthōs also immediately put forward a strong rebuttal: there is a skill, that is, the shepherd's skill does not care about the interests of the server, which well expounds the relationship between the ruler and the people. However, does Salazar Máthōs realize that there is another role, and that is "the owner of the flock". What will happen if the shepherd's role is separated from everyone's? Even if the two overlap, he must realize that shepherds, rulers and all those who can't fully implement their will in the group can't only realize their own interests-that is, they must practice justice to some extent. (The above is more obvious in 351-352C)

Glaucon's replacement seems to clarify an unclear question just now: Is justice independent of happiness or higher than happiness? In other words, do we choose justice because it is not or not only beneficial, or because it is worth choosing? When we are like that tragic justice fighter, will we still choose justice?

How similar this just and beneficial view is to the later contractual justice! We won't discuss this here for the time being.

Aderman Toth went further, and he proposed that the interests of justice actually made people pursue pseudo-justice.

Justice itself is worth choosing, which seems to imply that it is relaxed and happy. Is this possible? Look at Socrates' eloquence

At this time, the discussion about the ideal city-state was really introduced. Socrates explained that the city-state corresponds to the soul, and the city-state is bigger, so justice as a virtue is easier to observe. In fact, does this mean that justice can only be achieved in a good city-state? As the saying goes, "If there is a way, the country will be wise" and "If there is no way, the country will be stupid". Socrates may subconsciously want to explain that justice and law can only be unified in a good city-state.

However, does this logical premise, that is, the relationship between individual soul and polis, hold? Socrates and Plato did not explain, which may be one of the biggest problems in the Republic. Socrates' assumption is actually transcendental, and it is precisely because he and his audience accepted this assumption that a series of conclusions, such as: the best city-state should be like a person's city-state (that is, the unity of opinions) and the implementation of * * * productism, seem to be taken for granted.

However, in Glaucon's exposition, it has been pointed out that even if individual justice and polis justice can correspond, happiness is not relative. Individuals who choose injustice may get happiness, but as a city-state, they will suffer from "unhappiness". Therefore, we should ask the necessary questions: Do individual souls and polis have completely different attributes, so that justice found in individuals cannot be called justice in polis, and vice versa?

It is impossible for the whole Republic to notice this problem.

Socrates simply divided the polis into healthy (pig's), pure (warrior's) and beautiful (philosopher's). Music education, that is, the education of beauty and moderation, is particularly important in building a beautiful city-state. This is actually the difference between a robber and a samurai-whether they have reverence for beauty. At the same time, this kind of education itself depends on capitalism, because capitalism fundamentally eliminates desire.

Then came the discovery of justice. As a bright spot, this passage has a very dramatic effect-especially for readers who are not so advanced in wisdom. What is justice? This has always been the topic of our discussion. It is this virtue that gives courage, wisdom and temperance their proper places. None of them is justice. Only when there are all three can there be justice.

This actually means that there is no possibility of "justice" in the city-state, except philosophers, whether soldiers, businessmen or politicians, because they have only one of the three virtues at most, and because of this, they tend to expand their own virtues-for example, soldiers are often braver and more passionate, businessmen are often more accurate in calculation (moderation), and politicians are often more proficient in politics. Therefore, what these people crave in their bones (not even voluntarily) is the injustice of tyranny

Linked to Weber's concept of "iron cage", this interpretation of injustice is indeed thought-provoking. It is true that specialization (which can be regarded as the continuous development of a certain virtue here) has improved human material ability unprecedented, but correspondingly, is justice and other values more difficult to achieve, and is it gradually replaced by extreme instrumental rationality and tyranny injustice? Should the deep-seated reasons for the rise of liberalism be traced back to this direction?

Let's get back to the question. In order to overcome this injustice, everyone is required to be in his proper position. What the rulers should do includes: realizing productism in the upper class (overcoming desires and not hurting sheep), ensuring that the city-state is not too big (large enough and unified), and making gold belong to gold, silver to silver, copper to copper, and black iron to black iron.

Next is the description of gender equality and productism. Because the concept of equality is not clear, Socrates only gives the explanation of "what should be", and this explanation is also based on the premise that "a good city-state should conform to nature". We only need to pay attention to this point, which actually echoes the above saying that "the best city-state is like a one-person city-state."

Then there is the description of nationalism. The strict distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks actually implies Plato's own nationalist thesis, which seems unclear. According to Hobbes' description of the state of nature and the tragic state of war between people, the key to the unity of the polis as an individual lies in educating them about the crisis of nationalism, so that they can deeply feel the danger of foreign invasion and need unity. The more they demand a high degree of unity, the more they should do so! ! ! There are too many such examples in history! ! !

Socrates later gave justice a lofty and independent "idea" status, perhaps because he found it necessary to show that justice itself is worth choosing, not just beneficial. Is this the expression of oakeshott's "rationalism"? It's possible.

The next paragraph is very important: the way to transform a real city-state into a good city-state is the unity of political power and philosophy, but everyone soon noticed that this is unrealistic. Socrates actually gave two natural paradoxes of a good city-state:

1, a good polis can't be realized among barbarians, but civilized people are hostile to philosophers because they are used to the rule of bad polis.

2. Philosophers are contrary to polis in essence. Even if we can persuade the public to accept the rule of philosophers, we can't persuade philosophers to rule the polis. So, who will force philosophers to rule the polis?

The answer is Socrates' logical premise hypothesis! ! ! If the individual soul corresponds to the polis, then individual justice obviously depends on the realization of polis justice. Therefore, in order to become a philosopher (that is, to achieve justice), philosophers must shoulder the responsibility of ruling the city-state. Plato's elaborate design of the exposition of the king of philosophy actually reached its peak.

At this point, the important part worthy of analysis in the Republic can be said to have come to an end for the time being. It represents the peak of classical politics, just like a mountain that has been submerged by most of the oceans through the passage of time. Although we still admire the majestic ruins, for us at present, it may just be an island. Here, we take a passage at the end of The Republic as the conclusion, and pay our highest respect to this great classical political philosophy that has passed away.

Glaucon, this story has been preserved like this, without death. If we believe in it, it can help us, and we can cross smaller rivers safely without polluting our souls in this world. Anyway, I hope everyone will believe my following advice: the soul is immortal, and it can contain all evil and good.

Let us always stick to the upward road and pursue justice and wisdom. In this way, whether we live in this world or when we are rewarded after death (just like the winner of the competition gets a prize), we can all get the love of ourselves and God. Only in this way can we do everything smoothly, whether in this life or in the journey we just described 1000.