Wen/Changjiang Business Review Qi Jianbao, this article only represents the author's personal opinion

Some time ago, Ma Yun and Xiaoyao visited the store of Boxma Xiansheng, which indicates that Boxma has finally won the high-level recognition of Ali and will definitely access various resources of Ali. Therefore, Mr. Hou Yi said in high spirits that "Box Ma Xiansheng has not seen competitors so far".

The Internet is also full of praise, decoding and worship of Boxma Xiansheng's remarks, even including some professional investor reports. Box horse fresh life has become the first sample of new retail, and the limelight is the same.

however, applauding doesn't necessarily make a hit! After on-the-spot investigation and careful thinking, the author thinks that Boxmaxian lives in many questionable places, which has laid a great hidden danger for its sustainable operation. The pit trodden by traditional retail enterprises, the current model of box horse fresh life can not be avoided.

Let's take a look at the data released by Boxma Xiansheng recently:

1. The annual turnover of Jinqiao Store in 2116 was about 251 million yuan, and the floor efficiency was about 56,111 yuan, far higher than the average level of 1.5 million yuan in the same industry;

2. Online orders account for more than 51%, and mature stores that have been in business for more than half a year can reach 71%;

3. The conversion rate of online goods is as high as 35%, much higher than that of traditional e-commerce.

at first glance, these data are really shiny. However, the truth needs an analysis like "knowing the cow by skillful hands"-

Firstly, the excellent performance of Jinqiao Store does not represent the whole. Many retail enterprises will have star stores, and the single-store operating performance of these star stores is unmatched by Jinqiao stores.

second, the proportion of online orders. Boxma Xiansheng forcibly excludes many offline consumers in the payment process. In addition, Boxma Xiansheng's free shipping distribution of online orders is actually a high subsidy strategy (detailed later), so the proportion of online orders will naturally be high.

thirdly, when it comes to the fact that the online commodity conversion rate of Box Horse Fresh is higher than that of traditional e-commerce, the author thinks that the objects used by Box Horse Fresh are probably B2C models such as Tmall Fresh and JD.COM Fresh. In fact, the traffic between the two is very different: under the fresh online to offline, the user's login to Box Horse APP has a very strong purchase target, and the conversion rate is naturally high; However, Tmall Fresh and JD.COM Fresh are often random transformations brought by users' wandering on the Internet, so the conversion rate is naturally not high. So this comparison is of little significance. If it is necessary to compare, the commodity conversion rate in the fresh area of the physical supermarket exceeds 91%. How does the box horse compare?

Therefore, Box Horse only discloses partial and process indicators, but it is secretive about business outcome indicators such as sales volume and profit rate. This is the practice of reporting good news instead of bad news, which is really unconvincing. The hidden truth is that the operating results of Box Horse are not optimistic. Of course, as an enterprise that is still in the start-up stage, it is also a routine to conduct PR in this way.

below, the author makes a speculative analysis of the operation of Box Horse through some data, and discusses in the industry:

The daily sales of the top-ranked store in Box Horse is 411,111 yuan, the gross profit margin is 21%, the customer unit price is 61 yuan, and the delivery cost is 12 yuan/sheet. What exactly do these data represent? That is, if the store's monthly sales are 12 million yuan, the gross profit is 2.4 million yuan.

referring to the traditional supermarket front-desk store rate of 15-18%, the front-desk store fee of Box Horse will reach 1.8-2.16 million yuan, but the difference is that the back-office logistics fee of Box Horse is as high as 1.44 million yuan (based on the monthly order of 211,111, of which 61% are online orders, and the performance cost is 12 yuan/order), and the monthly profit is negative of 841-1.2 million yuan! The above data simulate the branches with relatively good operating conditions.

the above data comes from field research, and the data can only be roughly accurate. However, the accuracy of this data does not affect our basic business judgment: box horse fresh students are subsidizing, and box horse fresh students are seriously losing money!

In addition to data analysis, the author will talk about why Boxma Xiansheng fell into a loss quagmire from the perspective of business logic.

Everyone who has visited Boxma Xian knows that it has several typical features, which are also the focus of many enterprises' imitation:

a, a huge fresh seafood area;

b, the integration of catering and shopping;

c, the integration of stores and warehouses, the ultimate logistics and distribution experience.

but is this a feature or a BUG? The root of the loss may be based on these characteristics, which look beautiful but often can't stand the test of market and time-

1

Commodity strategy: the huge seafood area is a black hole of Maori

Boxma Xiansheng's huge fresh seafood area is really shocking and very eye-catching. Because few people dare to play like this, users often feel very fresh. But why don't established retailers such as COSTCO and Sam dare to do so? They are all enterprises with great single-store performance.

Anyone who has done fresh-keeping knows that fresh aquatic products are basically profit black holes, which are very difficult to make profits. They are basically structural supplementary products, mainly high-frequency fresh-water aquatic products, including Yonghui, a master of fresh-keeping. The business direction of this category is based on high standards of freezing and chilled fresh.

Boxma Xiansheng manages fresh seafood on a large scale in a more extreme way! The typical characteristics of this category are low frequency, high unit price and high loss. The low frequency is determined by the user's diet structure. Although our living standard has improved a lot, our diet structure has not changed fundamentally.

Box Horse's customer base is young white-collar workers, and the consumption power of this group does not support high-frequency consumption of high-priced fresh food, and this group's recognition of fresh food is not so high. The high unit price is determined by the high logistics cost and high loss of fresh seafood.

TAKE, a seafood supermarket in Shekou, Shenzhen, also deals in a large number of fresh seafood, and it is aimed at the high-level business banquets of surrounding large enterprises. TAKE's single store is very successful. The problem with Box Horse is to make a large-scale positioning of fresh seafood, a low-frequency and differentiated commodity consumer group. Serve who? Will these customers continue to pay the bill? This difference will lead to different results.

In addition, except for the huge seafood area, other products of Box Horse are not much different from those of boutique supermarkets. On the contrary, due to the limited consumption scene, the product portfolio is easily covered by opponents, and this consumption scene is not convenient from the consumer's point of view. Box horse's interpretation of the scene is only to subjectively splice the scene of "eating", but in fact it is not really to organize the goods from the perspective of consumers.

2

Category combination: The catering rental area will collapse

Talk about the integration of catering and shopping. Many commentators think that this is the first model of box horse, but the author does not agree. In fact, the supermarket industry has always been engaged in fast food, cooked food, pastry and other categories, and there will be a variety of light food and beverage combinations. What is the essential difference between this and a box horse?

However, under the tide of consumer upgrading, the slow supermarket enterprises did not upgrade these categories in terms of taste, variety, packaging, environment, service, etc., which led to the operation of this category becoming more and more low-grade, and gradually became the choice of employees' working meals or low-income people's dining. Therefore, it is too exaggerated to call the splicing of box horse catering and shopping a so-called cross-border business model!

the author also found an interesting logic: the purpose of box horse is to draw passengers online, which will inevitably lead to a relatively small number of customers arriving at the store; And the joint catering merchants in its stores are basically based on dining, so they can only compete for the remaining 31-41% of the passenger flow. How can they manage in this way? How can they contribute to the rent if they can't continue to operate?

Of course, with the brand influence of Box Horse, the occupancy rate of joint catering merchants may be maintained at a tolerable level for a period of time, just like many street shops always close down and people always take over. But in this state, how can we explain that the mode of box horse fresh life is competitive?

Some time ago, when I went to Box Horse for investigation, I saw that many joint-venture stores were making adjustments. In the long run, it is difficult to maintain the integration of rented catering and self-operated shopping, and it will be normal to change tenants like a cursory tour.

If we want to explore the integrated management of catering and shopping, the author highly recommends Yonghui's super-species approach. "They are serious about catering", with clear customer positioning, profit from efficiency and cost control, complete self-management and easy scale replication, and very solid and reliable work.

3

Logistics: the cost of performance is twice that of the industry

When it comes to the logistics of box horses, it is nothing more than the integration of stores and warehouses and self-operated distribution. There is nothing novel about this model itself, and many fresh e-commerce startups have done this. Different from others, Box Horse has really achieved the ultimate in user experience and raised the barriers to competition.

but in fact, there is a very high price behind this: the performance cost of 12 yuan/order. Don't question this data. Look at the salary structure of box horse fresh delivery staff: 21 yuan per hour during the protection period, 2 yuan for each delivery, and 8 yuan for each delivery at the end of the protection period (the data comes from the open recruitment website).

In addition, the box horses have to pay huge rent, equipment, personnel and packaging costs for the sorting area, which is why the data of 12 yuan/sheet is reliable. However, the cost of third-party distribution often only needs 5-6 yuan/order, and it has already begun to pay users.

Each branch of Box Horse is equipped with a huge and modern sorting backstage to ensure their order processing ability. On the surface, this kind of logistics investment has improved the efficiency of sorting. But in fact, fresh orders and take-away orders often have strong concurrency. This configuration is often designed based on peak orders. Just as the government designs highway width according to the peak traffic flow, in fact, the utilization rate is not high, and the general ledger does not necessarily bring about efficiency improvement.

In fact, the above reflects a very serious problem. Box horses have improved the consumer experience, but they have not improved the operational efficiency of enterprises. The logistics cost and the routine cost of the store are rigid. At present, the expense rate of the box horse store should be twice that of the ordinary supermarket. The author thinks that Box Horse has been subsidizing users, and how long can the prosperity brought by this subsidy last? How long can the subsidy last?

4

Operation: There is limited room for improvement in post-operation

Box Horse has strong online operation ability. Can it gradually improve its operating statements through post-operation I think it is very difficult.

a very big change in the current business environment is the fragmentation of the business district. Ten years ago, we could point out where the business center was without thinking. Now you have a try.

this is the result of comprehensive factors such as the change of users' consumption habits, the accelerated pace of life, the change of business structure brought by real estate, the increase of store rents and the increase of competition in the same industry. In this commercial pattern, the practice of box horse is equivalent to raising a big hippo in a small pond, and all the aquatic plants are not enough for it to eat! Even if your operation ability is strong and your penetration rate is high.

The deep-seated reason for the dilemma of Box Horse lies in the mismatch of resources. The failure of many start-ups lies in making small businesses into big costs. Another common reality is that the growth cycle of stores is shortening now, and it will enter a stable platform period in a very short time, and there will be no greater growth rate thereafter. This is more and more like a catering enterprise, which will see life and death within six months. So blindly hoping for the future may be disappointing. Box Horse's old shop has been around for almost two years. Will there really be high growth?

I agree with Mr. Hou Yi's statement and the theory of accurate core customer positioning, but I don't agree with Box Horse's handling of non-core users: it's almost a cleanliness. The consumption group characteristics of fresh users may be special, which presents typical "dual" characteristics: the group of uncles and aunts and the group of housewives, and this pattern may continue to exist for a long time. The aunts who sweep out the door with box horses are often the decision makers and implementers of three meals a day. Almost half of the transaction opportunities are gone, so how to improve the penetration rate by more than 71%?

therefore, whether it is more reasonable to target customers by family rather than by individuals. In addition, the consumption of fresh ingredients by single young people is actually very low. They only have a rigid demand for quality fast food, but compared with professional fast food, Box Horse has no core advantage.

The author has analyzed many problems of the box horse model above, but I am not a malicious attacker, just an objective comment. Finally, I would like to make three constructive suggestions, which are for reference only.

First, guide users instead of changing them, precipitate users instead of seducing them. The trend of online users is doomed, but the process is slow, and artificial acceleration may have no effect, so the author thinks it is necessary to conform to the law and prepare with both hands.

second, the big store was reduced by compressing water, and it evolved into a box horse. Lost a heavy burden of expenses to keep the box horse alive. The property availability of small shops is stronger, which can solve the bottleneck of rapid expansion at present; A large number of stores can give Box Horse more tentacles to stick to offline users and support its online strategy.

third, access to B2C as soon as possible, so as to realize the value-added traffic and make up for the shortcomings of the current commodity structure. Fresh food can only be used as a traffic category, and it is difficult to be used as a category to obtain gross profit. Fresh e-commerce entrepreneurs who died two years ago may have a deeper understanding of this. This is determined by the current situation of competition in the fresh food industry, and it is difficult to make money simply from the retail sector.

Ali may have high hopes for Box Horse, hoping that Box Horse can export methodology to build a team to integrate the entity retail enterprises it has acquired, which is the starting point of new retail. However, the current box horse has not proved itself, which may be the reason why Ali has not made further moves after a series of acquisitions.

the turning point of the retail industry has come, just as the substitution of supermarket formats for traditional formats in the 1991s is irreversible. Although there are many problems with Box Horse, we can't ignore the self-adjustment ability of this entrepreneurial enterprise! It remains to be seen whether Box Horse will become the new king or leave in a daze.