The following will share the experience of participating in on-site consultation and evaluation, the * * * problems found and some opinions from several aspects as follows:
I. Standardization and Classification of Work Safety
Enterprise safety production standardization standards are divided into first-class enterprises, second-class enterprises and third-class enterprises, among which the first-class enterprise is the highest. According to the scoring method in the Standard Specification and Standard Scoring Standard for Safety Production of Power Generation Enterprises (20 1 1 year), the evaluation score is (actual score/deserved score) × 100%. The rating standard score of power generation enterprises * * * includes 13 primary elements (new standard is 10) and11tertiary elements. The standard score is 1800, which is suitable for hydropower enterprises with 1470. The standardized first grade score is greater than 90 points (including 90 points), the standardized second grade score is greater than 80 points (including 80 points), and the standardized third grade score is greater than 70 points (including 70 points). The third grade of standardization is above, indicating that the standardization of safety production is up to standard. Basically, all my applications for participating in the power station are Grade I and Grade II.
If the project under construction declares that the safety production standardization meets the standard, it shall be implemented in accordance with the relevant requirements of the Evaluation Standard for Safety Production Standardization of Legal Persons in Water Conservancy Projects.
Second, check the composition of experts.
Experts involved in the investigation and evaluation are generally employed by third-party evaluation institutions in the fields of safety management, operation safety, hydraulic safety and equipment safety (hydraulic machinery, primary electrical equipment, secondary electrical equipment, fire fighting). These experts come from all over the country, including professional registered safety engineers and engineers in various professions, most of whom are professional and technical personnel from operating units and design units. I am mainly responsible for the safety inspection and evaluation of hydraulic machinery, flooded factory buildings, fuel and lubricating oil systems and pressure vessels.
If the owner of the project under construction (water conservancy) declares the standardization level of safety production, the experts arranged by the third party are mainly professional engineers of the construction unit and design unit.
Iii. Contents of on-site inspection and evaluation
On-site investigation and evaluation is generally divided into two parts: data access and on-site inspection, and the on-site working time is generally 3-4 days. 1 day will hold the first meeting and professional docking work, and conduct on-site investigation, take photos and consult a large number of materials. Because of the heavy task and short time, it is normal to work overtime at night, and the last half day is the last meeting. Each expert shall inform the person in charge of the enterprise of the problems found in the on-site inspection and evaluation, the rectification requirements or the published grading results.
Data: it is necessary to collect and consult the preliminary design and completion acceptance data completed by the design unit, the special report on the calculation of turbine dispatching guarantee, the closing time and setting value of guide vane and inlet valve; Installation, commissioning and overhaul (A\B) data submitted by the installation unit and operation and maintenance unit, field test reports of hydraulic turbines, ball valves and governors, equipment defect records, maintenance procedures, operation procedures, various setting values, oil test reports, periodic inspection reports of pressure vessels and efficacy reports of safety valves.
On-site inspection: check the operation status of each unit and its auxiliary equipment, the display and alarm status of various monitoring instruments, the vibration and swing monitoring system of the unit, the technical water supply system, the compressed air system, the working conditions of the plant equipment and liquid level meter to prevent flooding, the fuel and lubricating oil system, the layout of the oil depot, the ventilation and smoke exhaust, whether the fire-fighting equipment meets the specification requirements, and whether the pressure vessel and safety valve are qualified.
Fourth, several cases.
1. Layout of emergency gate of tubular unit
The two power stations are bulb tubular units, and it is found that the tailrace gate of the unit is designed as an overhaul gate and the intake gate is designed as an overhaul emergency gate, which does not meet the requirements of Article 3.3. 1 in Code for Design of Steel Gates of Hydropower Stations (NB3055-20 15) (the position is reversed). Moreover, the water inlet accident access door can not realize remote manual emergency under emergency conditions.
It belongs to the problems left over from the design scheme, and there are no rectification conditions on site, which brings great hidden dangers to the operation of the unit.
2, the unit overspeed protection setting value problem
When the turbine is in an accident condition, the guide vane closes quickly, which will cause the volute pressure to rise too much. If the closing time is slow, it will cause the speed of the unit to rise and fail to meet the specification requirements. Generally, the scheduling calculation of diversion system calculated by design units or universities will provide reasonable guide vane closing time, but it is found that the setting values of some pumped storage projects are often quite different from the calculated values, and the setting values of the last protection device of the unit (pure mechanical overspeed protection and centrifugal flying accident shutdown) are also quite different from the calculated values, which is not in line with the Technical Code for Automation Design of Hydropower Plants (NBT35004-20 13+).
Because this value needs to be set before the pure mechanical overspeed protection device leaves the factory, it cannot be modified after it arrives at the construction site, which belongs to the docking problem between design and site and brings certain hidden dangers to the operation of the unit.
3. The setting of water level gauge in the corridor at the bottom of the workshop.
* * * It is found that the liquid level meter that can immediately give an alarm and prevent the accident when the corridor or butterfly valve layer at the bottom of the submerged plant is not installed does not meet the requirements of Article 6.6. 1 3 of Technical Specification for Automation Design of Hydropower Plants (NBT35004-20 13): at least three liquid level meters or liquid level transmitters should be installed at the corridor layer at the bottom.
Belonging to the design problem, all stations have been reformed, three sets of water level meters have been added, and hidden dangers have been eliminated.
4. Layout of ventilation and smoke exhaust pipes of oil depot in the workshop and setting of oil baffle of high oil tank.
The ventilation and smoke exhaust pipes in the turbine oil depot and oil treatment room of the three power plants only lead out of the oil depot, but not out of the powerhouse, which is not in conformity with Article 9. 1 4 of Code for Fire Protection Design of Water Conservancy Engineering (GB50987-20 14) and Article/kloc-0 of Code for Fire Protection Design of Hydropower Engineering (GB50872-20 14)
There are two power station high-level oil tanks and bearing lubricating oil high-level oil tanks, with holes at the bottom and no blockage; There is no oil barrier around the fuel tank. According to Article 7.0.4 of Code for Fire Protection Design of Hydraulic Engineering (GB50987-20 14), oil retaining sills should be set around the oil tank and the holes should be blocked, which is a design problem. When there is an accident of high fuel tank, the lubricating oil overflows to the operation floor, which affects the safety of the workshop.
If the above problems meet the requirements of the specification, the workload of field modification is very large, which belongs to design problems and has hidden dangers of smoke exhaust and lubricating oil explosion.
5. Configuration of fire extinguishers and sand boxes in oil depots.
In several projects, the mobile fire extinguishers in the turbine room and the insulated oil depot in the plant are dry powder fire extinguishers, which do not meet the provisions of Article 8.6. 1 of Code for Fire Protection Design of Hydraulic Engineering, and should be foam extinguisher. In addition, there are 1 sandbox at the entrance of the main transformer corridor, the workshop floor and the diesel generator room, which does not conform to Article 1 1. 5. 3 of Code for Fire Protection Design of Hydropower Engineering (GB 50872-20/kloc-0+04). The number of sandbox should not be less than two.
The fire procurement list submitted by the design does not meet the requirements, and the site will be rectified in time.
Five, a few views
According to the requirements of GB/T 33000-20 16, enterprises should establish an enterprise safety production management system based on safety production standardization, maintain effective operation, find and solve safety production problems in time, and constantly improve and improve the level of safety production.
1. At present, all enterprises attach great importance to the standardization of production safety, which is a necessary way to implement the main responsibility of production safety in enterprises, a long-term system to strengthen the basic work of production safety in enterprises, an important basis for the government to implement classified guidance and hierarchical supervision of production safety, and an important means to effectively prevent accidents.
2. Before the acceptance of an enterprise, a leading group for reaching the standard is generally set up to improve various management systems and corresponding documents according to the standard requirements, formulate safety management systems and operating procedures, investigate and control hidden dangers and monitor major hazard sources, establish preventive mechanisms, standardize production behaviors, and make all production links meet the requirements of relevant safety production laws, regulations and standards, so that people, machines, materials, laws and environment are in a good production state and are continuously improved. To meet the requirements of safety production standardization, it usually takes a long time (for example, the Narengrad River water control project was completed in three years and passed the first-level standardization of safety production by the project legal person at one time), and a lot of manpower and material resources were also invested.
3. Design is the key to ensure the safe production of the project. As can be seen from the above cases, the congenital defects caused by the design unit not strictly following the specifications are very difficult to rectify, and some major defects cannot be rectified, which brings hidden dangers to safety production.
4. In the process of rectification and self-evaluation, enterprises must be familiar with various rules and regulations, especially fire protection, labor safety and industrial hygiene, seriously rectify the problems found and communicate with experts.
5. The information provided must be detailed. Some enterprises also set up folders according to the first, second and third level elements to sort out paper materials according to the requirements of experts. However, when they arrive at the site, they often find that the contents in the folder are quite different from what we expected. Some are vacant, some are repetitive, some are not what they want, and some have nothing to do with standardization. Don't put it in the folder, it will be frequently questioned.
65438+2022 10 month