I, at that time the international and domestic environment and the occurrence of the South Anhui Incident (a) changes in the international situation is the important reason for the occurrence of the South Anhui Incident in 1940 around the time of the international situation for the Kuomintang is more favorable. On the Japanese side, the anti-Japanese war had entered a phase of stalemate, in order to step up to promote the "southward" plan, and turned to the KMT to adopt the strategic policy of "political surrender as the main focus, supplemented by military strikes". On the British side, the hardliner Churchill came to power in 1940, and in order to safeguard Britain's colonial interests around the world, Britain's foreign policy began to change from "appeasement" to hardening. To maintain its interests in the Asia-Pacific region, Britain will inevitably have to contradict Japan in order to establish the "Greater East Asia **** Sphere of Glory". In order to restrain Japan's "southward advance", the United Kingdom tried hard to draw Chiang Kai-shek to sponsor China's war of resistance. For its part, the United States, the friction in the Far East with Japan's "southward" more and more large, also in order to safeguard their own interests in the Far East, the United States also stepped up its assistance to the national government. For the Soviet Union, increased aid to Chiang Kai-shek's government, the Chinese battlefield can attract more attention from Japan, holding back a large number of its troops, but also not to make their own east and west **** the same enemy. International pulling together, so that "Chiang Kai-shek felt a steep increase in value, forgetful, as if history has given him a rare opportunity to solve the problem of **** production party". This strengthened Chiang Kai-shek's determination to launch the Anhui Incident. (2) The KMT could not allow the New Fourth Army to develop and grow behind enemy lines, which was the most direct reason for the South Anhui Incident. The Incident was launched by Chiang Kai-shek for a long time in order to weaken the power of the ****production party. during the negotiation in Xi'an in 1937, the KMT did not give up its conspiracy of controlling, reorganizing, and weakening the guerrilla forces of the Southern Red Army, and adopted a series of political measures, but all of them were contrary to the wishes of the KMT. Since January 1938, after the official formation work of the New Fourth Army was launched to the end of 1940, it got the vast country between the Jiang, Huai, He and Han, and established the base areas of Wanzhong, Wandong, Northeast Anhui, Southern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Northern Jiangsu, Yuwan-Suzhou, and Southern Anhui, and the army was developed from more than 10,000 people at the time of its formation to more than 100,000 people. This was of great strategic significance for adhering to the war of resistance in central China and further developing and expanding the power of the people's revolution. Second, the crisis and contradiction within the ****production party and the occurrence of the incident in southern Anhui The eventual outbreak of the incident in southern Anhui was undeniably caused by the Kuomintang's anti-***, but there were some problems within the ****production party and the potential crisis in the military department of the New Fourth Army, which also sowed the seeds for the occurrence of the incident in southern Anhui. (I) The serious patriarchal style within the New Fourth Army and the narrow-minded prejudice of small producers, the serious patriarchal style of the New Fourth Army, the inherent feudalism and the narrow-minded prejudice of small producers were also one of the causes of the Anhui Incident. (ii) The relationship between the head and deputy head of the New Fourth Army was not properly handled, and the differences between the leaders of the New Fourth Army had a certain connection with the eventual outbreak of the Anhui Incident. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, the ****productivity party negotiated an agreement with the Kuomintang to reorganize the 28th Red Army and the guerrilla forces of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army into the New Fourth Army, with Ye Ting serving as the army commander and Xiang Ying as the deputy army commander. Xiang Ye's partnership should have been a perfect combination in terms of their own conditions, but there were differences between the two men for various reasons, so that their combined strengths were not put to good use. (C) The Party Central Committee's confusion about the situation*** The principle of the Communist Party is that the Party commands the gun, and the localities obey the central government, which determines the Party Central Committee's analysis and prediction of the current situation, and will inevitably affect the New Fourth Army's analysis and judgment of the current situation, which in turn affects the New Fourth Army's guidelines and policies. [3] After the Battle of Huangqiao, the C***nese Communist Party turned pessimistic in its estimation of the situation, was overly serious in its estimation of the dark situation, feared that Chiang Kai-shek had the intention of surrendering, and began to formulate a response program to the current situation. (d) The timing and routes of the C****'s northward movement were not chosen correctly 1. The timing of the northward movement was inappropriate. As early as October 19, 1940, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi demanded in their _Telegram_ to Zhu Pengye that all my Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army south of the Yellow River be transferred north of the old Yellow River. [3] In order to ease the contradiction between the state **** and to deprive Chiang Kai-shek of the excuse to launch a reactionary coup, the C*** decided to concede on the south of the Anhui province and agreed to transfer the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze River to the north of the river. Source: Party History Literature