Deng Hua (1910 04.28-1980 07.03), formerly known as Deng Duohua and Shiqiu, was born on April 28, 1910 in Beihu District, Chenzhou (formerly Chen County), Hunan Province, in the village of Pei Vice, Yongning Township (present-day Lutang Township), into a scholarly family. In 1925, he went to Changsha, where he attended Yueyun Middle School and Nanhua School of Law and Politics. He took part in the patriotic student movement, and in March 1927, he joined the Chinese ****anist Party. He returned to his hometown after the "Ma Ri Incident", and participated in the Hunan Uprising in January 1928, and served as an organization officer in the Political Department of the 7th Division of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, and went to Jinggang Mountain with Zhu De and Chen Yi in April, and successively served as a Party representative of the 4th Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army, an organization officer in the 31st Regiment, and a chief of the Organization Section in the Political Department of the 3rd Column, and attended the Ninth Congress of the Red Army (i.e., Gugang Mountain), which is the 9th Congress of the Red Army. From 1930, he served as a political commissar of the 12th Red Army's instructional unit, the 3rd detachment and the 36th division, and a political commissar of the 3rd and 2nd regiments of the 1st division of the 1st Red Army Corps. He participated in the anti-encirclement campaigns in the Central Soviet Area, including the fifth anti-encirclement campaign, in which he led the Red 1 Corps in a fierce battle for three days and nights and repelled the attacks of three divisions of the Kuomintang Army. In October, he accompanied the army on the Long March. In October, he went on the Long March with the army and fought in the Battle of Shanchengbao. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, he became the director of the political office of the 685th Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and took part in the Battle of Pingxingguan; in the winter of 1937, he became the political commissar of the Independent Regiment of the 115th Division, the political commissar of the 1st Sub-District of the Jinchahi Military Region, and the Commander and Political Commissar of the Pingxi Detachment, and he led his troops to take part in the Anti-Japanese Siege in the Jinchahi Military Region, and took part in the leadership of the Pingxi Anti-Japanese Base Area. In May 1938, he became the political commissar of the 4th Column of the Eighth Route Army, and led his troops to advance to the east of Jidong, consecutively capturing towns and cities such as Yanqing, Yongning, Sihai, and Xinglong, etc. He also cooperated with the China***Jihebian Special Committee in mobilizing and leading the armed insurrections of more than 20 counties in the eastern part of Jidong and the Kailuan Coal Mining*** of more than 200,000 people, and established about 100,000 people of anti-Japanese forces, and initially created the anti-Japanese guerrilla bases of the eastern part of Jidong. 1940, March. He led the formation of the 5th sub-district of the Jinchahi Military Region, served as commander and political commissar, and organized and led the troops to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese base in Yanbei. In the second phase of the Hundred Regiments War, he led a battalion in a night attack on a stronghold in Nanpo Tou and eliminated more than 70 Japanese soldiers. 1941, he became the commander and political commissar of the 4th sub-district of the Jinchahi Military Region and the secretary of the local committee of the C***, and he organized and led the troops and people in the sub-district to break the encroachment and sweeping of Japanese and pseudo-army. In March 1944, led to Yan'an, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Jinsui United Defense Force, Political Commissar of the 2nd Brigade of Instruction, November into the Central Party School of China ****. After the victory of the war of resistance against Japan, he went to the Northeast as deputy commander of security and commander of the Shenyang Guards, and in December 1945, he became commander of the Liaosi (later changed to Liaoji) Military District, organized troops to mobilize the masses in the area of Liaosi, eliminated bandits, and set up the people's power, and led the troops to take part in the Xiu Shui Hezi Battle and the Battle of Siping in 1946, and in April 1947, he became commander of the Liaoji Column of the North-East Democratic Allied Army (later changed to be called the 7th Column of the North-East Field Army). ) Commander. In the Northeast Autumn Offensive, he led his troops to take the initiative, and within 17 days, he conquered five cities, Faku, Changwu, Xinlitun, Fuxin and Xinqiu, and annihilated three divisions of the enemy, and was awarded by the headquarters of the Northeast Democratic Allied Forces, and after the Liao-Shen Battle of November 1948, he served as the commander of the 44th Army. During the Pingjin Battle, according to the front situation, he proposed to use a few troops to monitor Tanggu and concentrate troops to fight Tianjin first, which was adopted by the Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee of the Central Committee of the People's Republic of China, and he was appointed to command the Eastern Bloc and participated in the liberation of Tianjin in January 1949, and in May he was appointed as the Commander of 15th Corps of the Fourth Field Army, and he led his troops to take part in the Hunan-Ganzhou and Guangdong Campaigns. After the founding of New China, he was also the first deputy commander of Guangdong Military Region; in 1950, he organized and commanded the Battle of Hainan Island, in which two armies carried out a large-scale landing operation on wooden sailing boats, breaking through and destroying the Kuomintang Army's "three-dimensional defense" system of land, sea, and air; in July, he was appointed as commander of the 13th Army Corps. In October 1950, he took part in the war against the United States and North Korea, and became the first deputy commander and first deputy political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, assisting commander Peng Dehuai in commanding the first to fifth battles, and participated in the armistice negotiation as a representative of the Volunteer Army in July 1951, and in June 1952, he became the acting commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army, organizing and commanding the tactical counter-attack operations in the fall, the battle of Shangganling and the counter-attack battles in summer of 1953, as well as the battle of the "Battles of the North". After the Korean Armistice, he served as a member of the Volunteer Army. After the Korean Armistice, he became the Commander and Political Commissar of the Volunteer Army, and returned to China in 1954, where he served as the First Deputy Commander and Acting Commander of the Northeast Military Region, the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA, and the Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, and in November 1955 he organized and directed the Liaodong Peninsula anti-landing exercise with the participation of the army, navy and air force. In 1959, by Peng Dehuai wrongful conviction was removed from office; in 1960 as vice governor of Sichuan Province, in more than five years, had penetrated into more than 170 counties and cities, hundreds of factories and mines and more than 1,000 rural communities to conduct research. After 1977, he became vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences and a member of the Central Military Commission of China***. Comrade Deng Hua was a member of the First and Second National Defense Committees, a member of the Eighth Central Committee of the People's Republic of China, and an alternate member of the Ninth to Eleventh Central Committees of the People's Republic of China. He was conferred the rank of General in 1955 and was awarded the First Class Order of August 1, the First Class Order of Independence and Freedom and the First Class Order of Liberation. He died on July 3, 1980 in Shanghai. He was the author of Questions on the Modernization of Our Army's Equipment and Several Questions on the Future Anti-Aggression War and National Defense Construction. On June 27, 1950, the President of the United States, while announcing the sending of troops to Korea and interfering in the internal affairs of Korea, openly ordered the Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Navy to enter the Taiwan Strait and encroach on the Chinese territory of Taiwan, resulting in a direct aggression against China. On July 13, 1950, the Central Military Commission made the Decision on Defending the Northeast Border Defense and decided to form the Northeast Border Defense Army with the Thirteenth Corps as the main body, with Deng Hua as the Commander, Lai Chuanzhu as the Political Commissar, and Hong Xuezhi and Han Xianchu as the Vice-Commanders, with the Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Armies under the jurisdiction of the Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Armies, as well as the First, Second and Eighth Divisions of Artillery, and other divisions. On July 27, 1950, Deng Hua led the Corps Department northward to the northeast to carry out border defense duties, and set up the Corps Department in Dandong (then called Andong). Dandong was separated from North Korea only by a river. Deng Hua closely watched the development of the situation on the Korean battlefield, studied the strategic postures of the two sides, and linked the PLA's experience of fighting with enemies at home and abroad over a long period of time, and earnestly explored the tactics that should be adopted in case of fighting with the U.S. On August 13th, he pointed out in his report on the meeting of the senior cadres of the Border Defense Army that: the implementation of the tactics of infiltration is bold and courageous, the enemy's weak points are selected, and the enemy is inserted into the heart of the enemy from the enemy's flanks or sides, firstly the enemy rear contact is cut off. First cut off the enemy's rear contact, then divide and surround the enemy and annihilate them one by one. General enemy defense is more tightly arranged in the front, especially the U.S. Army firepower organization is better, from the front attack, not easy to work. And the U.S. Army's greatest fear is to cut off contact and be surrounded. He also pointed out that the troops must "fully develop close combat" and "develop night fighting". This tactical advice, after the volunteer army into Korea, during the campaign war combat practice proved to be correct, is effective. At that time, the Korean People's Army was fighting the U.S. invasion forces and Lee Seung-man's army to the side of the Nakdong River, liberating more than 90% of the Korean territory. But on the Nakdong River front, the battle was at a stalemate. After repeated studies with Hong Xuezhi, deputy commander of the Corps, and Xie Fang, chief of staff, Deng Hua put forward an estimate of the development of the situation in the Korean War, which was penned by Deng Hua and jointly reported to the Fourth Field Army. This report, issued on August 31, 1950, argued from two aspects that the U.S. Army would land on the Korean flank. Analyzing the terrain of Korea, the report said, "Because the peninsula is long and narrow and mountainous, there is a limit to the accommodation of superior forces. At the same time, I am fighting for the inner line, although the battle is active, offensive, but because of the three sides of the sea, the enemy has sea and air superiority, the enemy is likely to choose my weaknesses, from my side and back to land, in order to collect the benefits of the outer battle." Next, the report analyzes the battlefield situation from a strategic height, pointing out that "the U.S. empire is trying hard to hold on to the Daegu and Pusan areas and consolidate the beachhead positions with local counterattacks to buy time to wait for reinforcements to arrive before launching a counterattack; on the other hand, the opportunity for the North Korean People's Army to break down the enemy in various ways and annihilate him has already passed." "It is estimated that the enemy's intention to counterattack in the future may be, firstly, to land with one force at several places behind the coast of North Korea for disturbing and restraining, while its main force will gradually advance along the main railroad highway from the south to the north in the present place. One is to use a small force to circle with the KPA in the south to catch the KPA, while its main force will land in a big way behind the flanks (Pyongyang or Seoul area) to attack the KPA from front to back, in which case the KPA will be in a very difficult position." This judgment was consistent with that of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the Central Military Commission and the Northeast Military Region. In the face of this situation, the Central Committee made a timely deployment, firstly, deploying an additional army into the Northeast Border Defense Army; then, drawing two corps, assembling in the areas along the Jinpu and Longhai railroads, preparing to deal with the emergency situation. Under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and Commander Deng Hua, the units of the Northeast Border Defense Army were actively engaged in patriotism and internationalism education, and practiced intensively, especially in mountain penetration and detour tactics and close and night combat tactics, and made intense preparations ideologically, tactically and materially to cope with the emergency situation. On September 15, 1950, the U.S. Tenth Army, with more than 70,000 men under the command of MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces, landed at Inchon in the Seoul area behind the Korean People's Army, and then occupied Seoul, cutting off the supply of the front line of the Nakdong River of the People's Army, and the bulk of the People's Army was cut off to the south of Seoul. "Despite the repeated warnings of the Chinese government, the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel in early October and invaded the Yalu and Tumen rivers on the border between China and North Korea, and continuously bombed and strafed the border towns and villages of northeastern China with the U.S. air force aircraft. On October 8, 1950, the Central Committee of the People's Republic of China and Mao Zedong decided to organize the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) to "resist the United States and aid North Korea and defend the country", and successively appointed Peng Dehuai as the commander, political commissar and party secretary of the CPVA; Deng Huawei as the deputy commander, vice-political commissar and vice secretary of the party committee; Hong Xuezhi and Han Xianchu as the vice-commanders, Xie Fang as the chief of staff and Xie Fang as the chief of staff. Xie Fang was the Chief of Staff. All the commanders of the Northeast Border Guard took the oath to join the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and crossed the Yalu River on October 19, 1950 to fight in Korea. After the volunteers entered the DPRK, according to the strategic plan of the central government and Mao Zedong, Deng Hua assisted Peng Dehuai in commanding the 6 armies of the volunteers, and started the first battle on October 25, 1950, after 12 days and nights of fierce fighting, wiped out more than 15,000 people of the United Nations Army and the South Korean Army, and pushed them away from the Yalu River to the south of the Cheongchon River, and initially stabilized the war in Korea. It drove them from the Yalu River to the south of the Cheongchon River and initially stabilized the war situation in Korea. After being hit by the first battle, the arrogant and domineering MacArthur wrongly judged that China was only a "symbolic troop contribution" and "another small step taken by China on the diplomatic chessboard", and still commanded all the troops to advance, clamoring to finish the battle on Christmas Day (December 25) before the end of the war. （The Korean War was to be over by Christmas (December 25th). At the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army after the first battle, when summarizing the combat experience of the first battle and studying the next battle plan, Deng Hua, based on the enemy's and our situation at that time, especially MacArthur's arrogant and cocky psychological characteristics, proposed that the Volunteer Army should adopt the policy of inducing the enemy to go in deep in the second battle, which was favored by Peng Dehuai and other members of the Party Committee. enlarged meeting, Deng Hua deployed the second campaign on the basis of the opinions discussed by the Volunteer Army Party Committee, with the specific operational policy of "fighting on the inside, luring the enemy to go deeper, and attacking and annihilating the enemy on each side." In order to realize this battle attempt, the western front concentrated the main force of six armies, and another one corps was tasked to fight on the eastern front. The Americans were really fooled. They argued, "The Chinese forces were out of contact after the first bloody battle and appeared to have burrowed back underground and disappeared; there were no campfires to be seen, no tracks in the snow, and no supplies moving along the highways." MacArthur went so far as to assert that "the Chinese are not in the war now" and that the war "will be over in two weeks." So he commanded the U.S. Army of Lee and other subordinate forces to launch what he called the "Christmas Homecoming Offensive" on Nov. 24, with the U.S. side of the Western Front, "the Eighth Army advancing 12 miles in the first 36 hours with little or no resistance. But shortly after dark on November 25, disaster struck." It turned out that the Volunteers, under the command of Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua, launched a second campaign on the night of November 25th. The Eastern Front Volunteers then launched a powerful offensive on the 27th. Under the coordination of the Korean People's Army, the western and eastern volunteer armies, after a month of fierce fighting, wiped out more than 36,000 people of the "United Nations Army" and the South Korean Army, including more than 24,000 people of the U.S. Army, recaptured a vast area including Pyongyang and Wonsan, and liberated the Jungjin Peninsula and Yan'an Peninsula to the south of the "38th parallel". The U.S. army was defeated and the Eighth Army was defeated. The U.S. army was defeated, and the commander of the Eighth Group, Lieutenant General Walker, was killed when his car overturned during a hasty retreat. The U.S. Army was forced to turn to defense. The American New York newspaper commented, "General MacArthur walked right into the trap ...... and with it came one of the greatest defeats in the history of the U.S. Army." The U.S. Combined Press on December 5, 1950 relayed the New York Herald Tribune commentary wire. The great victory of this battle turned the tide of war and laid the foundation for victory in the war against the U.S. and with North Korea. After the second battle, the Chinese and North Korean people's armies conducted the third battle from December 31, 1950 to January 8, 1951, breaking through the "38th Parallel" in one stroke, liberating Seoul on January 4, 1951, and fighting all the way to the 37th parallel, wiping out the "United Nations Army" and the South Korean Army. "and the South Korean army more than 19,000 people.