A, Ganzhou campaign
1932 65438+1October 10, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the Military Instructions on Taking Ganzhou. In the "Instructions", it is pointed out that "the current task of the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area is:
First, we should stand on the primary task of establishing a solid revolutionary base for the outward development of the revolution, in order to win the first victory of one province and several provinces, and take advantage of the favorable opportunity of the current revolutionary development to resolutely seize Ganzhou, a city close to the Soviet area;
Second, continue the work of 193 1 year, go deep into the Fujian-Jiangxi Soviet area, create a vast area centered on Ganzhou, threaten the development of Ji 'an to the north, and bring the revolutionary development closer to the first victory of one province and several provinces. "
Under the guidance of this instruction, the Red Army began to deploy and attack Ganzhou. Because at that time, he advocated the development of northeast Jiangxi and opposed the attack on Ganzhou, and the leaders of the C.O. sought Peng's advice. Peng replied that there were an estimated 8,000 people in Ganzhou. If Chiang Kai-shek doesn't come for reinforcements, Ganzhou may be shot down. Therefore, Peng was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, commanding the Red Third Army Corps, He He and the Red Army to form the main combat army to attack the city, and the other combat army cooperated with the mobile army. Ganzhou is located at the intersection of Zhangshui and Gongshui in the upper reaches of Ganjiang River, surrounded by water on three sides and only land in the south. The city wall is high and strong, easy to defend but difficult to attack, so it is commonly known as "Tieganzhou". At that time, Ganzhou and Ji 'an were two strongholds of the national army on the Ganjiang River, which divided the two central bases of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Southwest Jiangxi, and the national army was prepared to stick to it here. Garrison in Ganzhou is the Ma Kun Department of the 34th Brigade of Jin Handing 12 Division of the National Revolutionary Army, with 8,000 people. Actively hoard ammunition and grain to stick to Ganzhou, and set up militia headquarters in seventeen counties in southern Jiangxi, adapting local ten thousand troops for training and consolidation, so that Ganzhou's national army reached eighteen thousand, far exceeding Peng's estimate of eight thousand. In times of crisis, Ganzhou National Army can also be reinforced by Guangdong Army in the southwest and Chen Chengbu in Ji 'an in the north. Peng's Third Army Corps, however, was only 14,000 men, outnumbered and stormed the occupying forces. Because there is no undercover in the national army, the enemy's situation is misjudged, which has brought a very adverse impact on the campaign process.
1932 At the beginning of February, the Red Army began to attack Ganzhou. Ganzhou national army destroyed the fortifications outside the city and retreated into the city to hold on. After the Red Army surrounded Ganzhou, due to the tall and solid wall of Ganzhou, it adopted the method of tunnel blasting to attack the city at the east and south gates. From February 8 to February 25, the Red Sanjuntuan attacked the city three times in a row, but failed to achieve the success of the campaign, and the two sides turned into a stalemate. Ma Kun, the brigade commander of the National Army, immediately sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek for help, and Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen Cheng to rescue Ganzhou. Chen Cheng sent two independent brigades, 1 1 division, 14 division and 52nd division, led by 1 1 division commander Luo, to Ganzhou for rescue, and arrived at Chizhuling on the other side of Ganzhou at the end of February. Yu Hanmou Department of Guangdong Yue Army also began to rescue Ganzhou at the end of February. When the Red Army could not attack for a long time and the national army reinforcements arrived, the Red Army mistakenly adopted the tactics of breaking the city first and then helping it. At dawn on March 4, the Red Army bombed the city for the fourth time, and the east gate wall was blown down by three large explosives for more than 20 feet. Unfortunately, before the explosion, a traitor defected to the enemy. The national army abandoned the old city wall, demolished the old houses in the east gate wall and built new fortifications. When the Red Army attacked the city, it relied on new fortifications and repelled the Red Army's attack. After the failure of bombing the city for the fourth time, the Red Army still mistakenly stationed its troops under the fortified city. So he sneaked out of the city and planned with Luo. He decided to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Red Army, such as no defensive facilities, no replacement of siege troops, heavy casualties in long-term fighting and excessive fatigue. He dug a tunnel between the east and south gates and between the west and south gates and sent troops out of the city to attack the Red Army. To this end, Huang Wei, the brigade commander of the 33rd Brigade of Luopai National Army 1 1 Division, led two regiments and an engineering battalion to sneak into the city from Jiangbei at night, and the Red Army did not know about it. At dawn on March 7, the defenders attacked from two tunnels, and the Red Army siege troops who were still sleeping were disrupted and divided. The first division of the Red Third Army Corps was captured from the teacher Hou Zhongying, who was executed by the National Government. Fortunately, the Red Fifth Army 15 Army rushed forward with broadswords, repelling the national army and turning other troops of the three armed forces into safety. Subsequently, the Red Army was forced to retreat from the battle by the besieged troops.
In this campaign, the Red Army commander misjudged the enemy's situation. In addition, in the case of the enemy's long-term attack and massive reinforcements, he should voluntarily withdraw from the siege or adopt siege tactics to help destroy the reinforcements. However, the commander of the Red Army still adopted the tactics of storming Ganzhou, which caused the troops to be exhausted after a long battle and suffered a fatal blow from the national army, and finally suffered heavy losses.
Second, Xifu Campaign
During the Second Civil War, Peng served as the commander of the Northwest Field Army in China. After many victories, at the end of 1947 and 10, Peng commanded the field army that had fought for half a year and went north to attack Yulin for the second time without rest. In the case of unsuccessful siege, the National Army Fu temporarily compiled 17 Division, Ningxia Ma Hongkui reorganized 18 Division, Cavalry 10 Brigade and Ningxia Public Security Corps to reinforce Yulin, and the Northwest Field Army changed the siege to Dayuan. The defeated national army reinforcements were forced to detour the desert to meet the national army in Yulin, and the Northwest People's Liberation Army was forced to quit the battle and suffered a small setback. 1On February 28th, 948, Peng commanded the Northwest Field Army to win the battle of Wazi Street according to the information provided by the undercover-confidential secretary around Hu Zongnan, and annihilated more than 30,000 people in five brigades of the National Army. Then they besieged Luochuan in an attempt to attract the national army to help and annihilate it, but failed. On April 7, the Northwest Field Army assembled in Malan Town. 13 On June 3rd, Peng held a meeting to arrange the Xifu Campaign. One or two columns attacked Baoji, the main base behind Hu Zongnan. Four columns served as defenders of the field army, six columns were inserted into the Xilan Highway to contain the "Sanma", ensuring the right side of the main force, and three columns ensured the safety of the southeast direction of the main force of the field army. On April 17, the fighting began. On April 26, the first and second columns captured Baoji, and the captured combat readiness materials were enough for the entire field army to use for two or three years. Hu Zongnan was shocked by the loss of Baoji. He urgently dispatched five reorganization divisions 1 1 brigades of the Fifth Corps and the Seventh Corps to fight back. Ma Bufang also actively cooperated with the reorganization of the 82nd Division in an attempt to attack the north and south and annihilate the * * * field army in the triangle of Jingchuan, Xifeng Town and villages. Being outnumbered, the Northwest Field Army of China was forced to retreat, and a large number of materials seized by Baoji could not be taken away and were forced to be destroyed. The national army frantically pursued the occupied towns along the way, leaving no one soldier to defend, and fully pursued the northwest field army of China. In Xifeng Town, due to the early withdrawal of China defenders, the national army seized Xifeng Town, and the main force of the Northwest Field Army, including the headquarters of the Chinese Field Army, was crowded in the south of Xifeng Town, which was very critical. Peng hurriedly commanded the troops to turn around and capture Xiaojin Town to the south, and made a tight encirclement to the southeast. On may 12, the field army finally withdrew to Malan town. In this campaign, the * * * 6th Battalion was besieged by the national army for many times, which caused heavy losses and consumed more than half of its troops. When summing up the campaign, Peng attributed the failure to impatience in thought, which resulted in the thought of underestimating the enemy, which made the troops excessively tired and seriously affected the operation.
Third, the 180 division failed in five campaigns to resist US aggression and aid Korea.
After four campaigns to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the U.S. military continued to advance northward. From April 22 to June 65, 438+0, under the command of Peng, the volunteers carried out five campaigns to resist US aggression and aid Korea. At that time, China * * * invested 9, 3, 19 Corps, 12 Force and 4 artillery divisions to launch a counterattack against the United Nations Army. From April 22 to April 29, the volunteers first launched the first phase of the offensive on the western front. Three regiments of volunteers divided into three groups to surprise the enemy. After continuous assault, the enemy was repelled to Seoul, the North Han River and the Zhaoyang River. Among them, the right-wing group 19 Corps, the 64th Army captured Changpoli on 23rd, and Ma Zhi was blocked after its establishment, and the two divisions of the 65th Army, the second echelon, went into battle again. As a result, the troops of five divisions were crowded in a narrow area of 20 square kilometers and were heavily bombed by enemy artillery and aviation, causing heavy casualties. Due to the failure to break the enemy's retreat and divide and encircle the enemy, the campaign developed into a flat push, and the result of destroying the enemy was not satisfactory. Peng decided to adjust his troops and launch the second phase of the offensive on the eastern front. After 10 days of consolidation, the 3rd and 9th Corps of the Volunteers launched an attack on May 16. The attack was well organized at the beginning, and the breakthrough was completed overnight. Defeated the 5th and 7th divisions of South Korea, annihilated five battalions, and surrounded and annihilated most of the 3rd and 9th divisions of South Korea in the county. After continuous operations, the volunteers were extremely tired in the later period, and the supply was difficult to maintain. On may 2 1 day, the offensive ended and the troops moved northward. The U.S. military command has mastered the law that volunteers can only carry out "worship offensive" because of insufficient logistics supply. When the volunteers attacked, they consciously retreated to the front line, wiped out our effective strength with superior firepower, and launched a counterattack at the end of the volunteer offensive. On February 23, the U.S. military began to counterattack the volunteers with four armies 13 divisions. In this counterattack, the US military specially organized a "task force" composed of motorized infantry, artillery and armored forces. Under the cover of a large number of planes and long-range artillery, it penetrated into the volunteers along the highway, which separated the deployment of volunteers and cooperated with the frontal enemy, which caused great difficulties for the withdrawal of volunteers. However, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army underestimated the enemy's situation, and only went down to the various corps, and did not organize the coordination among the various units, resulting in many gaps and loopholes among the corps, which were used by the enemy's "task force." The 60th Army180th Division of the 3rd Corps of Volunteers was besieged under such circumstances and suffered serious losses. Later, when summing up the experience and lessons, the preparations for this campaign were hasty and seriously inadequate in all aspects. This is mainly caused by Peng's eagerness to sabotage the plan of landing behind the volunteers. Coupled with the battlefield command error, the lower commanders made mistakes, which caused such losses.