The saying that Liu Bei was defeated by Lu Xun at the Battle of Yiling because of his 700-mile camp comes from a remark made by Cao Pi in the Chronicle of Emperor Wen in the Book of the Three Kingdoms:

Being ignorant of the art of war, how can a camp of 700 miles be able to repel the enemy?

The meaning of Cao Pi's statement is clear: Liu Bei did not know the art of war, so how could a camp of 700 miles be able to resist the enemy?

The reason for Liu Bei's failure seems to be that he had a 700-mile camp, but in fact, Cao Pi's words were followed by another sentence:

Bractracts of the original sermon are dangerous and the enemy is fowled by the army, which is a military taboo.

What Cao Pi meant by this sentence is: setting up camp in a place where grass and trees are overgrown, where the terrain is high and open, or where the ground is low-lying and wet, will inevitably lead to the enemy's defeat, and this is a taboo for the military.

Cao Pi, as an outsider, was able to discern some clues as to the reason for Liu Bei's defeat. What Cao Pi said was half right and half wrong, and what was right was to say that the reason for Liu Bei's defeat was because he stationed his army in the grassy woods, but Liu Bei did not have 700 battalions camped in a row, and Cao Pi's statement that Liu Bei's 700-mile camping in a row was incorrect, and that this is not true either.

Liu Bei's failure in the battle of Yiling was not due to the seven hundred miles of continuous camping, but for another reason, Liu Bei's failure was due to the following reasons: 1. Liu Bei stationed his army in a dense forest, which is what Cao Pi said? Bao Yuan sermon danger? , and ultimately Liu Bei was attacked by Lu Xun's fire because of this reason.

The army stationed in the woods, we have to camp in the woods, what is the most afraid of in the woods? Fire attack! There are trees, weeds and other flammable materials everywhere, once the enemy army set fire to the entire forest, Shu army where to escape?

In fact, Lu Xun saw this mistake made by Liu Bei, and sent the Eastern Wu army to strategically encircle Liu Bei's Shu army, and then set fire to the camp, the Shu army camp was burned, a sea of fire, and only then ultimately failed, which is the main reason for Liu Bei's failure.

2. Liu Bei gave up the navy.

This is also one of the main reasons for Liu Bei's failure, the battle of Yiling at first, Liu Bei is the land and water, water and land forces complement each other, take care of each other, in order to go all the way to Yiling.

When Liu Bei's army reached Yiling, Lu Xun relied on the dangerous terrain to block the advance of Liu Bei's army, Liu Bei exhausted all the ways, but also unable to break through Lu Xun army's defenses, it was at the height of summer, Yiling (Yichang, Hubei, today) and the local hot, Liu Bei's naval forces in the Yangtze River under the sun, under the scorching summer heat, Liu Bei ordered the naval forces on shore to set up camp.

As soon as Liu Bei's navy went ashore, it lost the right to control water, and the Eastern Wu navy could surround Liu Bei's army through the waterway, and after completing the encirclement, Lu Xun attacked Liu Bei's army in the woods with fire. It was precisely due to the fact that Liu Bei gave up his navy that the Eastern Wu army easily encircled Liu Bei's army, and Liu Bei's army suffered such heavy losses, or else even if Liu Bei's camp had been burned, he could have retreated backwards. The actual situation was that most of the back roads were cut off by Eastern Wu.

3. Liu Bei's supply line was stretched.

Liu Bei's army started from Yong'an (present-day Fengjie, Chongqing) and fought all the way to Yiling (present-day Yichang, Hubei), which was more than 300 kilometers deep into Wu's territory, that is, what Cao Pi called the 700-mile camp. It should be clarified here that the 700-mile camp does not mean that Liu Bei's camps were linked together to cover as much as 700 miles, but rather, it means that Liu Bei penetrated into the territory of the Eastern Wu for 700 miles.

Liu Bei's army total **** only 50,000 people, including the 10,000 barbarians Shamo Ke, Liu Bei's main army is 40,000 people, 40,000 people which is possible to even camp 700 miles? Liu Bei is in this seven hundred miles of the road set up a small number of barracks and contact points, not scattered 40,000 people of the army in the seven hundred miles of the occupied line, otherwise to Liu Bei this point of the army how can.

Because Liu Bei is seven hundred miles deep into the Wu territory, his supplies can only be transported from Yizhou along the Yangtze River, a long way to go, the battle line is long, there are difficulties in supply, and Lu Xun of the Eastern Wu is to wait for a long time, backed by the Jiangling, supply is easy, Liu Bei wants to fight, Lu Xun wants to delay, Liu Bei wants to fight, Lu Xun is not willing to participate in the war, with Liu Bei to consume, time, Liu Bei began to make a mistake, and that's what Lu Xun counterattacks This was the cause of Lu Xun's counterattack.

4.

The Shu army originally morale early rise, all the way from Yongan to Yiling, progress is smooth, but in Yiling this place has been blocked by the Wu army for half a year, hit and attack, the Wu army and do not go to war, the Shu army's patience a little bit of being consumed, and ultimately the division of the old soldiers tired, lost the sharpness.

Liu Bei's army lost its sharpness when it was the Dong Wu army's morale early opportunity, Dong Wu army has long been holding its breath, waiting for the opportunity, when Lu Xun found Liu Bei's mistakes, and a small test, and finally see the right time, the use of fire attack defeated the Shu army, Liu Bei's army was almost completely wiped out.

Liu Bei as the founder of Shu Han, fought a lifetime of war, is completely experienced, although I dare not say that Liu Bei fight every battle is a victory, but Liu Bei for fighting has long been familiar with the road, and experienced, but it is at this time to lose to the unheard of Lu Xun?

First of all, Liu Bei's strategy of launching the Battle of Yiling was not wrong, but the timing was wrong. Since capturing Jingzhou, Wu has been preparing for Liu Bei's revenge, and Sun Quan has gone out of his way to claim Cao Cao and Cao Pi as his vassals. Sun Quan is a political opportunist, and his claim to Cao Cao is not genuine, but merely a stopgap measure.

Liu Bei started the war long before Sun Quan expected it and made all the preparations for it, but Liu Bei rushed to start the war two months after he was declared emperor, and Liu Bei had his own reasons for rushing, but the timing of Liu Bei's war was obviously not right, and Liu Bei should have prepared himself well and waited until the relationship between Sun Quan and Cao Pi broke down, or he could have simply agreed to Sun Quan's request for peace and started a war while he was not prepared. The first is to wait until Sun Quan's relationship with Cao Pi breaks down before launching the war.

Liu Bei was also very helpless. The year he started the Battle of Yiling, Liu Bei was already 61 years old, and was about to enter the last days of his life, and if he didn't start the war, he was afraid that he wouldn't be able to survive for long, and he wanted to take advantage of the fact that he was still alive to fight for his son, Liu Zen, to gain a share of the political capital and to take back Jingzhou.

At the beginning of the war, Liu Bei was originally all the way to Yiling, has been smooth, of course does not rule out that this is the strategic retreat of the Eastern Wu army, human nature is like this, the smoother, the more likely to make careless, the more relaxed, the more likely to fail, the more impatient, the more likely to make mistakes.