However, "the same goal" can not erase the meaning of "different paths" From 65438 to 0993, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia signed a free trade agreement in Visegrad, thus forming Visegrad Group. These four countries are geographically close. The geopolitical concept of "Eastern Europe" belonged to "Central Europe" countries before the Stalin system was formed after World War II, and there were cultural-historical differences with Eastern European countries of Orthodox Slavic and Balkan countries of Southeast Europe with complex cultural traditions. In reality, these countries have the most sound democratic constitutionalism and the fastest economic development among the countries in transition, and are called "the first phalanx" countries. Therefore, people tend to ignore the differences between these four countries and classify these countries with coordinated development of democratic politics and market economy as "Visegrad model" countries. Poland is the most striking country among Visegrad countries.
Initial conditions for Poland's economic transformation
Poland has a land area of 312700 square kilometers, a population of 38.64 million (1end of 996) and a gross national product of 941300 million US dollars, all of which rank first among the countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe except the former Soviet Union, and play an important role in the whole "camp" of former Eastern Europe. Before the drastic changes, Poland's economic development was in the upper-middle level in the former Eastern Europe, and its per capita GNP was second only to the Democratic Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia, comparable to Hungary, but higher than other "camp" countries including the former Soviet Union.
Politically, Poland has a special historical background in Eastern Europe: on the one hand, it is a western neighbor of the former Soviet Union and has always regarded it as a barrier to Europe, which has irreplaceable strategic value to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Poland, as a big Central European country in the Middle Ages, has long been hostile to Russia. /kloc-At the beginning of the 0/7th century, Poland-Lithuania United Kingdom launched an offensive against Russia and once marched into Moscow to support the puppet regime. After Peter the Great, Russia became stronger, the tide declined, and Russia turned to invade the West. In more than 100 years, Poland was divided up with the German powers four times in a row, and historical events such as the Katyn Massacre took place, which made the Polish and Russian people form national hatred that lasted for hundreds of years. Throughout the pre-upheaval era, most Poles always believed that the former system was imposed on them by the Soviet Union, and even among Polish leftists and Orthodox Christians, this concept was deeply rooted. A. Lampe [1], a former member of the Politburo in communist party, Poland, was imprisoned in the old Polish government before the war 10, and was taken in by the former Soviet Union. 1943 died in the former Soviet Union. As the only survivor of Stalin's purge of Politburo members, he should be said to be pro-Soviet. But he left a famous "Lampe's last words": "If socialism is established in Poland with the bayonet of the Soviet Red Army, the socialist cause will be delayed for generations in Poland."
It is precisely because of the special sensitivity of Soviet (Russian)-Polish relations that the former Soviet Union has a more tolerant side towards Poland. For example, although 1956 started in Poland, the Hungarians only expressed their solidarity with the Poles, but the former Soviet army resolutely suppressed Hungary, but adopted a compromise policy towards Poland, allowing Poland, which came to power in 1956, to go its own way to a certain extent. On issues involving the basic interests of the camp, the former Soviet Union's control over Poland was very tough, so it constantly clashed with Poles. In the early 1980s, the Brezhnev regime even once considered sending troops to occupy Poland. At that time, the Polish government quickly took the initiative to impose martial law and suppress the opposition, which stopped the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the Polish government left a tiger's name, which became the first reason for its fall in the "drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe". In the 40-year history before the upheaval, Poland formed a periodic turbulent situation, which changed a little in five years and greatly in ten years, [2] and eventually became the first domino that led to the disintegration of the camp. 1989 and the subsequent "semi-free" general election produced the "solidarity trade union government". 1 990 65438+1October1,the first Polish delegation government began to implement the so-called "Balcerowicz Plan", taking the lead in systematic economic transformation in Eastern Europe, with the goal of fundamentally changing the system.
As the starting point of transformation, former Poland has the following characteristics:
1. Although the economic level is above average, the industrial structure is relatively backward. Although Poland has already completed industrialization, until the 1980s, about 30% of the labor force was still engaged in agriculture, and there were 1 10,000 farm animals (horses) in agriculture, which was a traditional agricultural country. The advantage of Polish agriculture is mainly the animal husbandry of "importing feed and exporting meat". In the secondary industry, mining and metallurgy industry accounts for a large proportion, which is the pride of Poland in the traditional heavy industry era. But in the era of "post-industry", "informatization" and new technological revolution, it has become the representative of "sunset industry". The high proportion of sunset industry is a major problem in Poland's transformation. The famous Silesia Industrial Zone is one of the three major mining, metallurgy and heavy industry cities in Europe, which is as famous as Ruhr in Germany and Central England-South Wales in Britain. It is also the largest mining and metallurgy comprehensive traditional heavy chemical industry zone in Eastern Europe. Poland is the fourth largest coal producer in the world, and its coal-related industries, such as metallurgy, electric power, chemical industry, mining and metallurgy machinery, are prominent. These industries are large state-owned trusts with high concentration and difficult transformation. Coupled with limited market, serious pollution and low high-tech content, it belongs to "sunset industry". Therefore, in addition to the system transition, Poland is also facing serious structural problems such as technological transformation and industrial restructuring.
2. Among the Eastern European countries, Poland and the Czech Republic belong to countries with democratic tradition and leftist tradition in the pre-* * era. Unlike the Czech Republic, medieval Poland practiced the free choice of kings. Since the restoration of the country after World War I, Poland has been a republic. In addition to the autocratic rule of Russia, Germany and Austria during the national subjugation in the19th century, the historical tradition of freedom and democracy is longer than that of the Czech Republic. In cultural tradition, France's influence on Poland is even greater than that of Russia, Germany and Austria. Poland is similar to France in religion and democratic thought. Before World War II, it was always called "Slavic France".
During the two world wars, Czech democracy and constitutionalism developed, while Polish "Sagnak regime" was quite autocratic. The "leftist tradition" of the two countries is also very different: the Polish Socialist Party is the founder of Sanac system, while the Czech Social Democratic Party has always pursued democratic constitutionalism. However, although Sanac's political system is authoritarian in the eyes of Poles with a long tradition of "freedom", it is actually moderate on a larger scale. At that time, Polish exiles were suppressed by Stalin's "great cleansing". Almost all members of the Politburo of the former Soviet Union died, and only Lampu, who was imprisoned under the Sanac system in Poland, survived. In fact, Poland's old system before the upheaval was milder than other eastern European countries. Before Stalin's death, the Polish Party also engaged in internal cleansing, but it did not kill people in large numbers like other eastern European countries. After Stalin's death, "non-Stalinism" appeared in Eastern Europe. This trend has been curbed in Hungary, the Czech Republic and East Germany. Only Marka, a Polish elder brother, succeeded and started "socialism with Polish characteristics".
In other words, Poland has practiced democracy for a longer period of time, even if it was dictatorship during the non-democratic period, it was moderate. This tradition makes "economic democracy" more active than other countries in transition. Not only in the process of dealing with public assets, that is, in the process of privatization, the degree of public participation is high, but also in privatized enterprises, "European-style" social democracy such as trade unions, employee stock ownership and social security responsibilities is quite strong. This naturally brings many characteristics to the transition process.
3. Based on the above reasons, the former Soviet Union allowed Poland some flexibility in its economic policy before the drastic changes. Therefore, Poland is one of the first two countries in Eastern Europe to implement so-called "market socialism" (the other is Yugoslavia). Polish economists have always been the base camp of market socialism theory in Eastern Europe. Before World War II, Polish left-wing ideological circles put forward the idea of "market socialism" for the first time in the world. Oscar, a Polish economist living in the United States at that time? Langer, Kaletski and others all became famous for this, and shined brilliantly in the "socialist debate" in the west in the 1920s and 1930s. During the post-war socialist period, Langer and others returned to China to train W? Bruce and other socialist market economic theorists advocate the implementation of economic reform policies such as simulated market and limited plan. Although this "deviant" theory is sometimes suppressed under Stalin's model, on the whole, it is still the most tolerant of "market socialism" in Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia) since Goethe Mulka's "socialism with Polish characteristics" was introduced. After the formation of the climate of reform within the system in the 1980s, "market socialism" gradually became the mainstream of Poland's economic thought before the drastic changes, and had a practical impact on the Polish economy.
Under this condition, Poland stopped collectivization after 1956, and never engaged in public agriculture again, becoming the only two eastern European countries that kept the system of "small farmers" (family farms) with Yugoslavia. Poland's industrial economy has long been in Oscar? Langer, Kaletski and Bruce initiated the experiment of decentralization and profit. The extroversion of Poland's economy is also quite high. Especially in the era of Girek's rule in the 1970s, Poland adopted the route of borrowing a lot, striding forward, pursuing high speed, high accumulation and high welfare, which made the whole economic system not only participate in the "socialist international division of labor", but also closely linked with the western economy.
However, the effect of "market socialism" in the Polish system is not good. Because of the internal conflict between the market mechanism and the planning mechanism, this conflict is particularly serious because of the heavy structure of the Polish economy, and because of the intervention of the former Soviet Union and the instability of domestic politics, the economic reform within the Polish system has not achieved the so-called "miracle" in a certain historical period like Yugoslavia and Hungary. Before the drastic changes, Poland's economy was in a state of relaxation and disorder, both in market order and planned order. Among them, the relative relaxation of planned order is a favorable condition for the later transformation, but the unsuccessful market-oriented reform within the system has left a shadow for the later market-oriented transformation.
Although Poland's economy was depressed for a long time before the drastic changes, in order to achieve stability, especially to increase the legitimacy of its rule under the system imposed by the outside world, the people's social welfare level was relatively high, especially in the agricultural field. On the one hand, before the drastic change, Poland implemented the family farm system, and agriculture was less bound by the old system than other collectivized eastern European countries; On the other hand, based on ideological considerations and the permission of the country's overall economic strength, the government established a developed social security for farmers in the 1970s. 1972 farmers nationwide implemented free medical care, 1978 farmers nationwide implemented a retirement system. At the same time, an agricultural prenatal and postnatal service system (the so-called "agricultural circle" system) supported by the state finance has been established. In order to compete for influence on farmers, the church also launched a "supporting agriculture competition" with the government. 1983, the church established a $2 billion farmer assistance fund to provide farmers with various production and living guarantees.
Generally speaking, the transition to market economy is a process of "liberalization" in two senses, that is, on the one hand, getting rid of the shackles of the old system and gaining freedom, on the other hand, losing the protection provided by the old system and "suffering" freedom. The former is an opportunity, and the latter is a price. For the system with strong restraint function and weak protection function, the process of getting rid of it is a process of pure income and less pay (the rural reform in China is typical). In a system with strong restraint and protection functions, the development opportunities gained by getting rid of restraint and the costs-risks and uncertainties paid by losing protection are equally obvious, such as the industrial system reform in most Eastern European countries. In those systems with less bondage and more protection, the process of getting rid of bondage has less benefits, but the cost of losing protection is obvious. This is the state of Polish farmers. At this point, the attitudes of Polish farmers and China farmers to the reform are in sharp contrast. China farmers are the main force to promote China's reform and create the "China miracle", while Polish farmers are more conservative than urban residents in the process of transformation. Poland is a country with a relatively strong peasant force, and the peasant population accounts for about 1/4 of the total population, with a high degree of organization. During the upheaval, the Polish Peasants' Party broke away from the United front under the old system and formed an alliance with the Solidarity Union, which accelerated the process of political upheaval. However, in the economic transformation since then, the peasant party has become the most "conservative" force. It not only turned to form an alliance with the left, but also opposed the radical reform of the Coalition government. On economic issues, it is even more "old-fashioned" than the left (social democratic party composed of "former people"), especially inclined to economic protectionism.
5. The main force of drastic changes in Poland is the independent trade union movement. Industrial workers represented by solidarity trade unions are highly organized, and as a trade union movement, they naturally have a strong tendency of unionism. Before the drastic change, trade union autonomy was the main force to subvert the old system, but in the period of economic transition, the powerful trade union power made the game process in the transition extremely complicated. "Trade unions scare away investors" is a prominent phenomenon in Poland's transition period. Privatization plans of many large enterprises in Poland are often repeated many times and are not accepted by trade unions, so the process of property rights reform is extremely difficult. After the drastic changes, the five regiments government pursued a liberal economic policy in theory, but its political foundation depended on the support of trade unions, at least recognition, so its activity ability was limited. Due to the powerful power of trade unions, Poland can't ignore the interests of employees in enterprises in the reform of enterprise property rights, and Czech-style "state distribution" and Hungarian-style "foreign investment auction" are difficult to realize. It can be said that cultivating the "bourgeoisie" under the condition of "trade union ruling" is the most prominent feature of Poland's transition to a market economy, and it is also the fundamental reason why a series of "transformation paradoxes" are particularly prominent in Poland.
Balcerowicz plan and its influence
1 990 65438+1October1,Poland began to fully implement a radical reform package named after Finance Minister Balcer Rovic. In the following four years, the political situation in Poland was turbulent, and the Communist Youth League government changed hands. However, Balcerowicz was re-elected as finance minister or other economic director in four governments, responsible for the economic transition during this period. Of course, the radical transformation strategy adopted by Poland at this time was not the result of personal personality factors, but was largely related to the economic situation and social sentiment at that time.
During the period of 1988- 1989, Poland's economy was in chaos, commodities were extremely scarce, inflation was fierce, GDP fell, and foreign debt reached 49 billion US dollars. [4] The country has almost lost its ability to pay. In such a severe situation, controlling inflation with both fiscal and monetary austerity is the primary measure to stabilize the economy. As far as convention is concerned, it is a normal technical reaction to implement fiscal austerity in inflation and fiscal expansion in deflation, and it is difficult to have other options under normal circumstances. However, the formation mechanism of transitional inflation in eastern Europe is very different from that of overheated inflation under the condition of conventional market economy, and the implementation focus of austerity policy is also different. The result of fiscal austerity is a decline in investment, a shortage of funds for enterprises, shrinking demand and a decline in the whole economy. During the period of1990-1991.6% and1.7%, private consumption decreased by 15.3% and investment in fixed assets decreased by 9% respectively.
This "shock therapy" in Poland has various short-term and long-term effects, and it is full of dramatic scenes of unexpected optimism and unexpected pessimism, which is extremely interesting.
First of all, unexpectedly, it is a quick and short-lived "comfort" that appears soon after "shock". However, Comfort soon fell into a state of "collapse" for quite a long time. The former was unexpected by the opponents of "shock", while the latter threw cold water on the supporters of "shock".
1990 at the beginning of the new year, Balcerowicz's "stability plan" was promulgated. Although the society experienced a period of "pain", it felt the "curative effect" almost from the moment the plan was implemented: the inflation rate dropped sharply month by month, from the average monthly rate of 167% in the previous year to less than 2% in August of that year, so that newspapers began to cheer for the devil of inflation. Indeed, if this trend continues, then the number one goal of "shock therapy" can be said to have been achieved.
At the same time, other indicators of economic balance have also improved rapidly. Although the output of the enterprise has decreased, the benefits have increased and the financial situation has been greatly improved. From 1989, the national finance reached a huge deficit of nearly 1/5 of the government expenditure, and turned into a "shock". After half a year, the surplus will reach about 3% of GDP! On the other hand, despite the shrinking economic aggregate, exports have increased substantially. In particular, exports convertible into hard currency suddenly increased to 35% in the first year of "shock". With imported consumer goods flooding the market, the foreign trade balance unexpectedly changed from last year's deficit to a record $4 billion surplus. Foreign exchange reserves have also gone from almost exhausted to a considerable $4 billion. At the same time, the disgraced zloty strengthened and became the first "100% freely convertible" currency in Eastern Europe. The black market of foreign exchange disappeared automatically, and people changed from buying dollars to selling dollars for zloty. In the first seven months alone, 2.5 billion dollars of hot money returned to the state treasury. The shortage of goods, queuing and ticket purchase have completely disappeared, and a buyer's market has appeared in Poland for the first time since the war ... These have caused waves of cheers, and it seems that the "shock" period will soon pass.
However, this "comfort" suddenly passed. That autumn, the macro-economy began to be out of balance again. Since September, inflation has risen again, making the annual average monthly inflation rate reach double digits again; The national finance is once again in a state of emergency. 1990 The surplus in the first half of the year was basically exhausted by the end of the year. 199/kloc-0 showed a deficit of 3 1 trillion zlotys in 1992, which rose to 69.3 trillion zlotys. Foreign trade has also deteriorated from a surplus of $4 billion in 1990 to a deficit of $0/991300 million in 0; After a year and a half of stability, the zloty exchange rate continued to depreciate; People began to sell zloty again ... however, the decline in production, the increase in unemployment and so on. This is at the expense of temporary "comfort" and shows no signs of reversal. Public opinion in Poland was once again full of depression, and it didn't improve until the second half of 1992.
A similar situation is not unique to Poland, but also occurs in several other austerity countries in Central and Eastern Europe to varying degrees. After Russia implemented the Gaidar Plan in June and 1992+ 10, there was a trend of price stabilization after "one step in place". In February, even in Russia 1/3, prices "slowly fell", and the national budget achieved a deficit-free budget within a few months, while the ruble, which was in sharp depreciation, once strengthened, even rose sharply in February-March, from 230 rubles to 85 rubles to Kloc-0 dollars. For a time, it seems that the Russian economy is expected to recover from the "shock". However, the good times did not last long. In the second half of the year, the situation deteriorated sharply, prices soared again and the inflation rate soared. By June 1993, the monthly rate finally reached the "malignant" level of more than 50%. The ruble exchange rate also fell again from 1992 at the end of June, and showed an accelerated downward trend.
The fate of the "malkovich Plan" in the former Yugoslavia is also typical. 1990' s "shock" plan was called "miracle" by some people soon after its implementation: within three months, the annual four-digit hyperinflation was almost completely eliminated. The dinar was once freely convertible in China, and the exchange rate was stable. Foreign exchange funds of citizens and enterprises flowed into the national treasury, exports increased, national finance and foreign trade receipts and payments improved, and foreign debts also declined for a time. However, the situation soon reversed again, and the domestic political crisis finally made the plan unsustainable after half a year of implementation. After the failure of the malkovich Plan, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also fell apart.
Bulgaria1991February went into "shock" and the inflation rate began to decrease from April to June. The inflation rate of 1992 decreased from 450% in the previous year to 80%. The foreign exchange reserve has increased from 50 million US dollars to1200 million US dollars, and the exchange rate of the lev has also stabilized. However, the national finance failed to improve, the deficit in 1992 was higher than that in the previous year, and inflation rose again in 1993.
"Shock therapy" has produced almost immediate "curative effect" in stabilizing (rather than developing or transforming) the economy, which embodies the power of economic logic. But the persistence of these "curative effects" shows that "shock" alone is not enough. Facts show that, apart from eliminating shortage, other therapeutic effects of "shock therapy" may gradually reverse over time, and if the long-term basis is only the shrinking demand caused by austerity (called "demand obstacle" according to the popular terminology in Eastern Europe), then "eliminating shortage" itself will gradually become a disease that needs treatment-this is the "weakness" disease that we know its taste.
Why? There is a simple reason. As mentioned above, in the operational sense, "shock therapy" itself does not care whether the surname is "Zi" or "She". It only uses severe austerity to correct the destructive imbalance in the economy to stabilize the economy. Because it is aimed at the logical reasons that caused the imbalance before, its "curative effect" is logically guaranteed (that is, as long as it is implemented, it will have curative effect. Of course, if you just want to implement it but can't implement it, or encounter side effects, you can't guarantee the curative effect. But it is also logical that "shock therapy" can create balance (that is, it can correct imbalance at one time), but it cannot maintain balance. To maintain balance, there must be a "hand"-either a "visible hand" (administrative planning mechanism) or an "invisible hand" (market mechanism). If there is no "hand", even if the balance is established, it is difficult to maintain. Although the above-mentioned reversal of curative effect in Russia and Central and Eastern European countries-some people call it "the second pain"-has its own specific reasons (Poland's predicament in 199 1 is largely related to the external factor of the disintegration of CMEA, while the aggravation of Russia's economic imbalance is partly due to the incomplete implementation of "shock" measures), fundamentally speaking, the common reason lies in ". From this perspective, Eastern Europe is not only different from Latin American countries in the 1980s, but also different from China around 1990. The former has a primitive market mechanism, and the balance created by "shock" can be maintained by "invisible hand"; In the former planning mechanism, the balance created by "shock" (which China called "contraction") can be maintained by "visible hand", while in Eastern Europe, it is a bit "but he failed to find the one he was looking for in both places".
What's more, although "stability" and "transformation" and price liberalization and privatization are mutually conditional and complementary in the long run, in the short run, some "stability" measures and the order of their implementation are unfavorable to "transformation". For example, it has been pointed out that the Polish Solidarity Government should tighten monetary policy as soon as it takes office, and should not wait until the "stability program" is promulgated a few months later before joining the price reform. But they didn't do it. As a result, after the new government took office, enterprises still obtained a large number of low-interest loans and bought a large number of imported raw materials and semi-finished products at official prices lower than the market, resulting in a 2.5% decline in the production of state-owned enterprises in 1989 (the year before the "shock"), while the inventory of raw materials and semi-finished products soared by 20.9%. After the "shock" began, these low-cost inputs were transformed into high-priced products after the price was liberalized, which made the state-owned enterprises in a "shock" state. This kind of false "interest" makes enterprises feel no pressure and does not take advantage of the "comfortable" period of rapid reform. In this way, the cost of conversion increases, the "second pain" time is prolonged and the intensity is increased.
However, the weak "non-state-owned" departments are unable to enjoy the official price because of their weak funds, and are directly under the pressure of high interest rates, high taxes and weak market during the austerity period, and are in a difficult situation. Individual farmers, in particular, complained bitterly under the dual influence of "foreign aid" food influx and weak domestic demand, so that 199 1 held demonstrations calling for foreign aid.
In short, in theory, macro-austerity exerts the same pressure on all economic sectors. But for various reasons, in fact, at least in the initial stage, the pressure on the non-state-owned economy is often greater than that on the state-owned economy. Then we saw an incredible phenomenon: after Poland's "non-government" came to power, state-owned enterprises were "comfortable" and private enterprises were struggling! The short-term impact of this situation is naturally that privatization is blocked, and the medium-term impact is that the private economy has enhanced its adaptability under pressure, while the state-owned enterprises have muddled along in "comfort", so that they were caught off guard when the "second pain" came and fell into the abyss of serious recession. The comprehensive result of short-term and medium-term effects is to expand the time difference from austerity to privatization, making "reverse evolution" more typical.
In short, due to various reasons, the economic reform in Eastern Europe, which was originally conceived as the parallel of stability and transformation, has mostly become a two-step model of stability first and then transformation.
Polish privatization
At the same time of double deflation of money and finance and full liberalization of prices, the Polish government began to implement an ambitious privatization plan. However, prices can be liberalized immediately and tightened, but privatization does not mean that "modernization" can be realized. In fact, the privatization plan in Balcerowicz plan was not nearly realized until eight years later, that is, during the second right-wing government. There are several reasons for the slow privatization process in Poland:
First of all, the drastic changes in Poland originated from the mass movement, which was aimed at corruption and privatization under the former system. During the last two United Workers' Party governments in Poland, the authorities tried to push enterprises to the market in order to curb the power of trade unions and comprehensively strengthen the power of managers. As a result, many managers use their power to enrich themselves, and the loss of state-owned assets is serious, resulting in the momentum of so-called "spontaneous privatization". After the new government came to power, the first measure taken was to freeze and check this "spontaneous privatization". This liquidation method naturally delayed the implementation of other privatization procedures. As some foreign scholars have pointed out: "Ironically, during the first Polish non-government period, the privatization process of state-owned enterprises did not accelerate, but slowed down. The key point is that emerging (trade union) politicians cannot accept' spontaneous' privatization and managers have the right to dispose of enterprises politically and morally. This phenomenon must stop. " [6] Spontaneous privatization is contained, while legal privatization involves very complicated interest relationship adjustment. Under the democratic system, it is inevitable that the legislative framework can be formed after repeated bargaining by society and parliament.
At the beginning of the upheaval, the Polish government drew up the earliest "large-scale privatization" plan in Central and Eastern Europe, in which the whole people shared some state-owned assets equally by securities. However, this plan is contrary to the concept of "workers are factory owners" in the Polish trade union movement, and this bill has never been passed in the parliament with a majority of solidarity trade union members. This bill was formally rejected by Parliament during the second coalition government, namely the belec government. Interestingly, only after the Solidarity government stepped down and the left wing came back to power, under the auspices of the Democratic Left Party government, a similar bill was passed. But it was already five years after the drastic change, and the general trend of privatization had become a reality. The Czech Republic's function of establishing an "equal starting point" by distributing investment vouchers can no longer play a role.
Second, even if the legislative framework of privatization is adopted, the opinions of all stakeholders and their trade unions must be repeatedly sought in every case of specific implementation. Lenin metallurgical joint venture in the former Krakow region changed its name to Senjimila Metallurgical Joint Stock Company after drastic changes. Its first privatization plan was negotiated between the former Ministry of Industry and a Canadian company, which was rejected by the three major trade unions of the company at that time. Later, a committee composed of government departments, representatives of the three major trade unions, enterprise technical management departments and foreign experts adopted the privatization plan in 1994, and completed its first-stage transformation procedure in 1996. At this time, it has been seven years since the drastic changes in Poland. Semjimira case has always been regarded as a typical example of the smooth privatization of large Polish enterprises. In other cases, four or five successive privatization plans were rejected by trade unions and aborted. The most typical one is the Gdansk Shipyard where Walesa once worked, the birthplace of solidarity trade unions. The privatization plan of the factory for five consecutive years has not been approved by the trade union. Finally, due to the delay of reorganization, the financial situation of the enterprise continues to deteriorate. After the solidarity trade union stepped down and the left-wing government came back to power, it eventually went bankrupt and liquidated because of insolvency.
The equal sharing of state-owned assets by the whole people has not passed, and it is impossible to replace state-owned property rights through purchase when private capital is very weak. Polish nationalism, especially the strong trade union power in Polish enterprises, has hindered foreign investment. In this way, Poland's privatization can only rely on the following forms:
1. Small privatization. Auction small shops and small businesses. Because of its small capital and easy purchase, this work was successfully completed during the Communist Youth League government, which led to the active situation of small private enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households in Poland. However, this small-scale privatization has limited impact on the macroeconomic situation.
2. "Pretty girls marry first" privatization. Among those high-quality assets with good profitability, internal employees themselves have strong privatization motives, and external buyers are willing to contribute to this. Under the conditions of Poland at that time, this privatization was usually carried out in the way of so-called democratic insider privatization, that is, employees in enterprises held shares equally.
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